VIETNAM WAR

**Vietnamese Village 1970 Handbook for Advisors**

Translations & Publications Branch, Management Support Directorate, CORDS

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Vietnam War:
*Vietnamese Village 1970 Handbook for Advisors*

Abstract: This handbook is designed to inform advisors at all levels of the structure and nature of the Vietnamese village. It covers the traditional village leadership, village government, village economy, village security, and the advisory role.
THE VIETNAMESE VILLAGE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
Community Development Directorate
CORDS

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: The Vietnamese Village - A Handbook for Advisors

1. This handbook is designed to inform advisors at all levels of the structure and nature of the Vietnamese village.

2. This is important to the CORDS mission because the Government of Vietnam, in its Pacification and Development Plan for 1970, has laid particular stress on the full development of the village as the foundation upon which the provincial and national communities can rest.

3. In tradition and history, the Vietnamese village has played a major role in the life of the Vietnamese people. The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan is designed to strengthen the self defense, self government and self development of this fundamental Vietnamese political entity.

4. For a CORDS advisor to be effective, therefore, a full understanding of the detailed structure of the Vietnamese village is essential.

5. Through support to this program of the Vietnamese Government, the CORDS advisor can assist the people of Vietnam themselves to develop the strength and unity essential to a just termination of this long and tortured war.
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"The King's Law Bows to Village Custom"
(Phep Vua thua le lang)
Ancient Proverb.

A. SUMMARY

1. The traditional structure of village society in Vietnam has all but collapsed under the pressures of war and rapid social and economic change. The enemy, in an effort to cut off communication between the rural population and the Government of Vietnam, has explicitly targeted village/hamlet government. During the last decade, he enjoyed fair success in neutralizing the GVN "presence" in many areas of rural Vietnam.

2. The 1970 Pacification/Development program is a political/military strategy which seeks to revitalize the village community. It blends relevant tradition and necessary innovation to create a viable local governmental structure, one which is capable of leading the rural population in the defense of their interests and the solution of their problems.

B. TRADITIONAL VILLAGE LEADERSHIP

3. Since the beginning of Vietnamese history, the village has been the basic unit of local government. Traditionally, the village community enjoyed a degree of autonomy, as indicated by the proverb quoted above. It said that as long as a village took care of its own affairs quietly, paid its taxes regularly and supplied men for the emperor's army when needed, the state did not interfere.
INTRODUCTION

4. Many Vietnamese seem to conceive of the village as having been in the more or less distant past an ideal democracy, where man lived in harmony with nature and his fellow man. There is a large element of myth in this—a myth which sometimes leads Vietnamese populists to declare that most current problems could be solved "if we could only restore the old traditions". In truth, the village in pre-colonial days was never wholly autonomous and rarely democratic. Historical research indicates that the surface harmony of the village was largely the product of the villager's lack of opportunity for either geographical mobility or social advancement. As a result, the villager had no choice but to accept the dictates of the village elders, or "notables", who were at least partly intent on preserving their own privileges by preserving "harmony".

5. There was a strong tradition of justice and civic service which tended to prevent serious abuses of power by the village notables. On the whole, it was a workable, if extremely conservative system, suited to a traditional peasant culture. The French, who conquered Vietnam in the last half of the 19th Century, recognized this at once. The colonial authorities did not interfere with the village, save to hold the notables accountable for the collection of taxes (of which there were many) and the provision of labor for public works projects.

6. The traditional system of village government has crumbled under the pressures of war and economic and social change during the past twenty-five years. The young Vietnamese is no longer content to follow in his father's footsteps. Drawn by the bright lights of the cities, or by the adventure and advancement promised by the Viet Minh or Viet Cong, hundreds of thousands of the more energetic and ambitious peasant youth have left the villages. At the same time, a large part of the traditional leadership class, the elderly "notables", has been killed, has been frightened into channeling its civic energies into strictly religious pursuits, or has fled to the cities. Danger, diminution of authority and prestige combined with a growing workload, and finally, minute salaries, made village office an unattractive proposition. It is no wonder, then that there has been in recent years a great shortage of talented and motivated leaders at the village level.
C. THE WAR AND THE VILLAGES

7. It is the village/hamlet official, not a far-away district or province chief, who personifies the Government of Vietnam to the rural citizen, to whom he may look for assistance and advice. For this reason the village and hamlet governments were a principal target of the enemy insurgency in its early stages and remain an important target today. By neutralizing the village governments, the enemy was able to cut off nearly all communication between the central government and the rural population. Where he was successful in this effort, he could then harness the rural population to his own war machine.

8. The enemy posed as a social reformer, the protector of the little man against the "bullies and exploiters" who supposedly held village office for the GVN. In practice, however, his main weapon against the village leadership was, and remains, selective terrorism. Particularly in the early years of the insurgency, the Viet Cong showed remarkable skill in killing off the better officials while leaving the worse untouched. It was a weapon which the most popular local officials were ill-equipped to counter.

9. In the early and middle 1960's the enemy thus was rather successful in his campaign to neutralize or frighten into the district towns the village officials appointed by the GVN. In parts of rural Vietnam the central government was hard pressed to maintain even a symbolic presence. Time and again it was found that GVN "authority" in a village consisted of little more than a village office and a small outpost. There village officials would issue documents and inform casual visitors that the population was pro-GVN, while a Popular Forces platoon guarded the outpost and a few hundred meters of road. At the same time, very close by and especially at night the enemy would be free to tax, to conscript labor, and to hide his troops among the rural population. The people would be carefully watched and controlled through automatic "membership" in various front organizations -- the "Liberation Farmers' Association," the "Women's Association" the "Liberation Youth," and so on. Masterminding the operation would be a handful of well-trained and experienced Viet Cong political cadre, backed by local guerrilla organizations. As long as this enemy organization remained unchallenged, with the power of life and death over the villager, the most attractive GVN development program would be doomed to failure.
10. The enemy had in this fashion extended his sway over portions of rural Vietnam by 1964 when he chose to attempt a quick victory by changing the character of the war. His escalation to large unit formations and his large scale infiltration of North Vietnamese troops was countered by the commitment of substantial US and other Free World Forces. Thus, during the mid-1960's the general re-establishment of effective local government had to take a back seat to other, higher priorities. In this respect the bloody failure of the enemy's Tet and May, 1968, attacks may prove to have been a key turning point. It gradually became apparent that the GVN had emerged from the crisis stronger and more stable than before. The enemy's main force units had suffered a terrible bloodletting and few Vietnamese believed any longer that the Communists were capable of seizing power by military means.

D. THE PACIFICATION/DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

11. A gradual refinement of pacification and development concepts and techniques had begun long before the enemy launched his desperate Tet, 1968, attacks. It was recognized early that successful pacification is no simple process, and that development could take place only in a climate of round-the-clock security. It was clear that large units can support, but cannot implement, a pacification program, and that in any event there could never be enough large units available to secure every village. At the same time the Revolutionary Development program demonstrated, despite failures as well as successes, that pacification could succeed even with limited resources under the proper conditions.

12. The rural population of Vietnam is weary of never-fulfilled enemy promises, of unending tyranny. The villager realizes, perhaps best of all, that the enemy's grip on the countryside has weakened considerably. Experience has demonstrated repeatedly that, given weapons, organization and good leadership, the villager will actively defend his life, his family and his property.

13. Successful pacification is essentially a problem of counter-organization. Current Pacification/ Development strategy, with its emphasis on the revival of strong village communities, is aimed toward that end. The overriding objective of the village development effort is to confront and supplant the enemy's political/military organization in every village with a deadly rival -- a "friendly infrastructure." Strong links must be established between the pro-GVN leadership of the village and the bulk of the population, on one hand, and between the village leadership and higher levels of government, on the other.
14. The Pacification/Development plan is built on the assumptions that:

a. The village community, including its constituent hamlets, is central to the life of the rural Vietnamese.

b. The rural Vietnamese, working within the village framework, with assistance as appropriate from the central government, can effectively manage his own affairs, solve his own problems and, by doing so, erect a strong bulwark against Communist efforts to undermine Vietnamese society.

15. The revival of "Community Spirit" is a key theme of current Pacification/Development strategy. This may be understood as the reinvolve of all of the best elements of the village community in a cooperative effort to improve their own lives by securing and developing the village.

16. The revival of Community Spirit is stimulated by the GVN through:

a. The modernization of village government, including large-scale delegation of decision-making power to the village, strengthening of village finance, intensive leadership training of village/hamlet officials, and extension of the elected-government system to all relatively secure areas.

b. The delegation of primary responsibility for local security to the village, through village control of Popular Forces, People's Self-Defense Forces, and Police.

c. The encouragement of popular initiative and broad popular participation through an expanded, locally-determined self-development program assisted by Revolutionary Development Cadre under village control.
II

Village Government

"The roof cannot be stable unless the house's pillars are strong. The national government cannot be stable unless the village governments are strong."

-- Old Saying

A. SUMMARY

1. All but a handful of the Republic of Vietnam's 2100 odd villages share a common governmental structure based on a division of powers and functions between an elected village council and a partly-elective, partly-appointive administrative committee (VAC). Hamlets are subdivisions of the village and hamlet management boards are extensions of the VAC.

2. Current pacification strategy is built on the premise that village governments must be full partners in the pacification/development effort. Local administrative relationships have been significantly realigned. Decree #45, promulgated in April, 1969, greatly expanded the authority, personnel and responsibility of the village governments. At the same time, it integrated them more closely with the district and province administration.

3. The village chief and his subordinates are called upon to be strong leaders, as well as administrators. They are the link between the GVN and the rural population. Their paramount task is to rally the best elements in the village to the common task of building a united and progressive community.

B. VILLAGE GOVERNMENT IN THE GVN STRUCTURE

4. There are between 2100 and 2552 villages and between 10,000 and 12,000 hamlets in the Republic of Vietnam, depending on which tabulations are consulted. The higher figures generally include villages and hamlets which remain "on the books" but have been depopulated by
refugee movements. As of 22 Sept., 1969, 2,000 villages had elected governments. Similarly, some 8,000 hamlets had elected hamlet chiefs. Most of the remaining villages and hamlets were administered by appointed officials, who were to be succeeded by elected authorities as soon as elections were feasible. ("Village government," as used below, will refer to the elective type unless specifically noted). By 1970 most villages had elected governments and during 1970 the village governments elected in 1967 ran for re-election.

5. The Government of Vietnam is organized under a unitary structure established in the Constitution promulgated on 1 April 1967. All powers are vested in the national government which in turn delegates authority to the forty-four provinces and to the villages. Corps commands and districts are administrative echelons which in civil matters play a monitoring and trouble-shooting role.

6. Although villages vary radically in size, ethnic composition, terrain, economy and security, before the law all are equal. The one thing common to every village is its status as the lowest unit of government which is a legal entity, having the power to make a budget, to levy taxes and to own property. Hamlets are simply administrative subdivisions of villages. Decrees No. 198 and No. 199, both dated 24 December 1966, and amended by Decree No. 45, promulgated on 1 April 1969, establish a uniform village government structure. They reverse the tendency of the later French colonial and Diem eras to concentrate authority at higher echelons. Considerable responsibility for the conduct of village affairs is delegated to a partly elective, partly appointive village administration.

7. Decree #45 established two types of village administrative organizations. Class A villages, with populations in excess of 5,000, are authorized a few more officials than Class B villages (5,000 inhabitants or less). Although the effect of this precedent was initially minor, it indicated a growing awareness on the part of the central government that individual villages face varying requirements and that higher echelons must tailor programs to meet the individual needs and capabilities of the villages.

8. Section C of this chapter discusses the composition and formal responsibilities of the village council, the village administrative committee and the hamlet administrative committee. Section D deals more broadly with the leadership role of the village chief, the village's relationships to the district and province administrations and
VILLAGE GOVERNMENT

certain problem areas. Village Finance, including management of the Self-Development Program, and Village Security organization are treated in subsequent chapters.

C. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION OF THE VILLAGE GOVERNMENT

9. The village government has two major components, the village council and the village administrative committees. Hamlet administrative committees are an integral part of the village government.

10. The village council is the village's policy-making body. It determines the course of village affairs (in many cases subject to review by higher authority) and gives general direction to the village administrative committee, the village's executive body.

The Village Council

11. Organization.

a. The village council is elected at large by the inhabitants of a village over 18 years of age in a direct and secret ballot. Depending on the population of the village, from six to twelve council members are elected.

Up to 2000 inhabitants...... 6 members
2001 to 5000 inhabitants..... 8 members
5001 to 10,000 inhabitants... 10 members
Above 10,000 inhabitants..... 12 members

Village councilmen serve for three year terms and may be re-elected.

b. At a newly-elected council's first meeting, it elects one of its members to serve as village chief, or head of the village administrative committee (VAC). The village chief becomes a non-voting member of the council, and the council's voting membership is thus reduced to an odd number.

c. The council member who received the highest number of popular votes (excluding the council member who serves as village chief) serves as village council chairman. The second-highest vote-getter is deputy council chairman. A third member is elected by the council to serve as secretary-general.
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12. Function

a. The village council may discuss any problem of interest to the village and may express opinions, proposals or aspirations to higher authority. Such recommendations must "be considered and resolved within the shortest period of time," and the village council must be informed of the outcome.

b. It is the village council's job to decide all matters of policy within the village. By law, it is charged with deciding the village budget, construction projects, concessions and contracts, transfers or rentals of village property, taxes, receipt of legacies, changes in boundaries, and so on. In many cases, however, the council's decisions must be reviewed by either provincial or national officials, as indicated by Chart #II-2. This is often a time-consuming process. Decree #45 in April 1969, decentralized authority slightly. Village budgets no longer need to be sent to Saigon for review and village councils may now spend up to 100,000$ (vice 50,000$) without higher level review.

c. The village chief must bring before the council all questions regarding land affairs, professional practices by villagers and recruitment of village/hamlet employees. The council scrutinizes the village administration's execution of its decisions and of GVN programs in general. The council is also charged with monitoring the behavior of all GVN personnel working in the village, "particularly their attitudes toward serving the people."
The Village Council is delegated power of decision over a wide range of matters. In most cases, however, council decisions must be reviewed by the province chief ("P" in the chart below) or the ministry ("M") concerned. The chart breaks out those powers specifically delegated to the village council by Decree No. 198 (as amended by Decree No. 45) and indicates necessary higher level approval.

### Power of the Village Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>REVIEW</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None: P: M</td>
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1. **Village Budget:**
   - establishment
   - amendment

2. **Construction Projects, Equipment, Programs:**
   - creation and modification of village plans
   - totalling over 1,000,000$
   - involving village properties, 100,000 to 500,000$
   - involving village properties, over 500,000$
   - involving road construction or alignment

3. **Concessions for Public Services:**
   - for more than 3 years, total more than 500,000$
   - for less than 3 years, total less than 500,000$

4. **Contracts (with Village Financial Responsibility):**
   - over 500,000$
   - under 500,000$

5. **Transfer, Purchase or Exchange of Village Property:**
   - total expense over 500,000$
   - expense from 100,000 to 500,000$
   - expense under 100,000

6. **Leases or Rentals (expenditures):**
   - over 3 years, over 500,000$/year
   - 3 years or less, cost of 100,000 to 500,000$/year
   - cost under 100,000$/year

-10-
7. Taxes, Fees & Rentals (income):
   -- establishment of new items
   -- establishment of percentage rates
   -- regulations concerning collection

8. Loans & Subventions (Salary Subsidies)

9. Receipt of Donations or Legacies:
   -- with conditions
   -- without conditions

10. Changes in Boundaries or Removal of Offices:
    -- changes in village boundaries
    -- moving village offices
    -- changes in hamlet boundaries

11. Organization & Administration of Markets, Fairs

12. Disputes:
    -- amicable settlements
    -- legal proceedings

Village Government
This last is an important function, and one which has been traditionally associated with village councils. From the dawn of Vietnamese history it was a responsibility of the village councils of Elders to advise the Emperor of any abuses of authority by his mandarins or officers.

d. Except for decisions requiring higher level approval, the village chief must carry out the village council's instructions within fifteen days or explain why he has failed to do so. In the event of a deadlock between the village council and the village chief, either party may ask the local district or province chief to "solve" the matter.

e. The village council is authorized to meet in regular session for four days each month and to meet in special session for two additional days, if necessary. It must meet at least once a month, and usually it meets oftener. Each council member, including the village chief, receives 300$ per meeting day. Meetings are generally public, and often are attended by concerned village and hamlet officials and elders. On the request of the council chairman the village chief or one-half of the members, the council may meet in secret session.

f. Every council member may suggest items for the agenda, which is made up by the council chairman after consultation with the village chief and the other officers of the council. Half of the memberships constitutes a quorum. If a quorum cannot be formed, the council may be reconvened twenty-four hours later and act legally no matter how many members are present.

g. With one exception, a simple majority vote decides questions before the council. Village officials may be removed from office by the council only for malfeasance and only by a three-fourths majority.

The Village Administrative Committee


a. The Village Administrative Committee, or VAC, is the executive branch of the village government. It consists of the village chief, who heads the committee and serves as its chairman, the deputy village chiefs for Administration and for Security, and all village commissioners. The committee is required to meet in work session at least twice a month to review work completed, to work out plans of action for future months, and
coordinate with other agencies in the village. The com-
mmittee is also required to meet at least once a month with
the Village Council in a meeting under the joint chairman-
ship of the Council Chairman and the Village Chief. (See
Chart #II-2)
CHART #II-2

VILLAGE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION

per Decrees #198 (4 December 1966) and #045 (1 April 1969)

VILLAGE COUNCIL

VILLAGE CHIEF

DEPUTY VILLAGE CHIEF FOR ADMINISTRATION

COMMISSIONERS
* AGRICULTURE AND LAND AFFAIRS
* EDUCATION AND SOCIAL WELFARE
* FINANCE
* TAXATION
* LEGAL DOCUMENTS

VILLAGE OFFICE
CHIEF SECRETARY
ASST. SECRETARY
INFO/C.H. CADRE
2 TECHNICAL CADRE

DEPUTY VILLAGE CHIEF FOR SECURITY

SPECIAL ASST. FOR PACIFICATION
R D CADRE (30-MAN GROUP)

COMMISSIONER FOR MILITARY AFFAIRS

PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

HAMLET CHIEFS

NOTE: Chart depicts Class A village organization. Smaller Class B village lacks Assistant Secretary, has only one Tech. Cadre and Dep. Village Chief for Administration is also Finance Commissioner.
b. The relationships of these various officials among themselves and with other GVN elements at the village level such as Popular Forces and Revolutionary Development Cadre are depicted on Chart.

c. Hamlet Management Boards (HMB) are not, strictly speaking, part of the Village Administrative Committee. However, the hamlet chiefs are directly responsible to the village chief and the Hamlet Management Boards function essentially as extensions of the VAC. They are discussed in paragraph 18, following.

14. The Village Chief:

a. Appointment, Term of Office and Removal.

The village chief is elected by the village council from among its membership, as described above, paragraph 11 b. He holds office for a term of three years, concurrent with the village council. He may be removed from office under certain conditions, including malfeasance, unjustified absence from duty or imprisonment. If the village chief resigns, dies or is dismissed from office, the village council elects a successor from among its membership.

b. Duties.

The village chief is charged by law with broad responsibilities. He:

(1) Directs all GVN affairs within the village. He supervises the VAC (for which he is responsible to the village council) and "oversees the functioning" of all other governmental agencies.

(2) Executes decisions of the village council.

(3) Supervises the maintenance of security and public order. In this function he is responsible for the operational control of forces placed at the disposal of the village authorities, including Popular Forces.

(4) Reports to district and province any significant occurrences.

(5) Publishes and enforces GVN laws and regulations.

(6) Represents the village before the law.
(7) Certifies documents and signs receipts and authorizations within the limits of village budget appropriations.

(8) Arbitrates minor disputes and performs marriages.

In other words, the village chief is simultaneously planner and administrator, policeman, commander-in-chief and justice of the peace. Unofficially, he is also often a lobbyist (to higher authority), a politician and, at numerous ceremonial or festive occasions, a master of ceremonies. His position calls for a high degree of leadership ability, stamina and motivation. Unquestionably, he is the key man in the village. The village chief's leadership role is discussed in greater detail below, Paragraphs 34-38.

15. The Deputy Village Chief for Administration.

   a. The Deputy Village Chief for Administration is nominated by the Village Chief with the approval of the Village Council, and is appointed by the Province Chief. The Province Chief must, whenever possible, respect the nomination of the Village Chief. Under the direction of the Village Chief, the Deputy for Administration coordinates the activities of the Commissioners for Finance, Taxation, Agriculture, Social Welfare and Legal Documents. In a Class B village (under 5,000 population), he serves concurrently as Finance Commissioner. The Deputy for Administration additionally supervises the village office. The Village Chief may delegate to his Deputy for Administration authority (including sign-off authority) in all civil matters with the exception of the authority to release funds. In the Village Chief's absence, the Deputy for Administration automatically acts for him, but cannot authorize expenditures.

    b. Deputy Village Chief for Security. The Deputy Village Chief for Security, like the Deputy Village Chief for Administration, is nominated by the Village Chief with the approval of the Village Council, and is appointed by the Province Chief. Under the direction of the Village Chief the Deputy for Security is responsible for handling problems concerning administrative and judicial police, public order, military draft and military affairs, and serves as judicial police agent. Under Decree No. 045 the Deputy for Security is also made responsible for following up political activities, organizing intelligence networks, supervising popular self-defense and youth and sports activities, and representing the Village Chief when absent or busy with respect to military and political problems.
16. Commissioners.

a. General: Commissioners are appointed by the village chief with the approval of the village council. The province chief establishes general criteria for appointment (age limits, educational requirements, draft status, anti-communist viewpoint, etc.). Appointments are reviewed by the province chief or, more often, the district chief, for conformity to these criteria and may be disapproved. If neither approved nor disapproved for 20 days, the appointment nonetheless becomes effective. The village military commissioner must be selected from the ranks of the Popular Forces. All other commissioners must be local civilians. Commissioners are responsible to the village chief through the village deputy for administration. They may be discharged by agreement of the village chief and village council.

b. Commissioner for Economy and Finance: The finance commissioner is responsible for the management of all village funds and assets. He is assisted in the management of village-owned land by the agriculture commissioner. The finance commissioner is the village treasurer and accountable cashier. He manages the budget, which he usually prepares, and other economic and supply problems. As he is also responsible for "studying measures to develop the village resources," the finance commissioner normally plays a major role in village self-development activity.

c. Commissioner for Taxation: A sound financial base is essential to the development of strong village government. Recognizing the need to focus attention on the improvement of tax collection, the GVN established the position of tax commissioner in the 1969 reorganization of village government. The tax commissioner is responsible for the maintenance of village tax rolls and for the collection of taxes.

d. Commissioner for Agriculture and Land Reform: The agricultural commissioner's job includes two broad functional areas. First, he is responsible for bringing technical assistance to the village's farmers, fishermen, woodcutters, and fruit and livestock raisers, with the assistance of cadre from agricultural ministry services at province level. Second, he is the village's expert on real estate and its administrator for land reform. He also assists in obtaining Agricultural Development Bank loans for deserving farmers.
VILLAGE GOVERNMENT

e. Commissioner for Social Welfare and Culture: The social welfare commissioner is responsible for village management of programs in the fields of education, social welfare, public health, public works, refugees, veterans' and labor affairs.

f. Commissioner for Legal Documents: The legal documents commissioner (sometimes also called the civil status commissioner) is responsible for the day to day management of all matters concerning official documents for individual citizens. These include I.D. cards, birth, marriage and death certificates, residence certificates, permission to transport strategic commodities, voting cards and so forth. He is assisted by the secretaries in the village office.

g. Commissioner for Military Affairs: The Commissioner for Military Affairs directly handles the command of PF units in the village and is responsible for village defense, patrolling in and about the village, laying of ambushes and search for an destruction of the enemy in conformance with plans and instructions of the Village Chief. He is appointed by the Village Chief and must be a member of the Popular Forces.

h. Village commissioners will not necessarily be trained technicians in their respective fields. Such is particularly true, for example, in the case of the Commissioner for Social Welfare and Culture who is responsible for education, social welfare, public health, public works, refugees, veterans and labor affairs. These commissioners are expected, however, to have a practical working knowledge in their areas of responsibility, to be able to identify problems, to assess progress being made, to contribute to planning and budget formulation, and to serve as a contact point and channel for the village people when information or assistance is needed from the village government or from higher levels.

17. The Village Office.

a. General: A village office is organized in each village. Its primary purpose is to assist the Village Administrative Committee in carrying out its responsibilities. Appointments to positions in the village office are made by the Province Chief or by designated ministries. The Deputy Village Chief for Administration is responsible for general supervision of the village office.
b. Village Chief Secretary: Sometimes referred to as the "principal secretary" the chief secretary heads the village office. He is often regarded as "the district chief's man in the village." He supervises general administrative and clerical work and maintains custody of the village's seals, forms, records and files. In a Class B village he serves also as postmaster.

c. Secretary (or "Assistant Secretary"): The secretary is appointed only in a Class A village. He assists the chief secretary and replaces him in his absence. The secretary also serves as postmaster.

d. Information and Chieu Hoi Cadre: The Information and Chieu Hoi Cadre represents the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi in the village. He is recruited, trained, assigned and managed by the Ministry, but is under the operational control of the Village Chief. He is responsive to the province and district VIS and works closely with the hamlet Information and Chieu Hoi Cadre to execute information, polwar, popular proselyting and Chieu Hoi programs in the village.

e. Technical Cadre: There are two technical cadre in a Class A village and one in a Class B village. The position was established in the 1969 reorganization. The technical cadre is a trained generalist responsible for serving the village, its people and its officials in economic, social, cultural and political activities; for explaining government policies to the people; for providing information and guidance in the various village technical activity areas; and for assisting village officials in carrying out their duties. Technical cadre operate under the direction of the Village Chief, but are appointed, paid and managed by the Ministry of Interior.

18. The Hamlet Management Board

a. At full strength, the Hamlet Management Board (HMB) is a five-member committee. Its head is a hamlet chief who, like the members of the village council, is directly elected by the people. His term of office is three years, and is not necessarily concurrent with that of the village council. The hamlet chief has two deputies, for administration and security. These individuals are nominated by the hamlet and appointed by the Village Chief. The District Chief may veto the appointment; if so, he must outline his objections in writing. Additionally, a hamlet management board may have an information/chieu hoi cadre (appointed by the Ministry of Information) and a hamlet military
assistant (drawn from the ranks of the Popular Forces and usually a senior squad leader).

b. The hamlet is an integral part of the village and the HMB is an integral part of the VAC. Thus the various members of the HMB function, more or less, as extensions of their "counterparts" at village level, and under their guidance. (See Chart #II-3) The Hamlet Chief, by law, "represents the Village Chief in his hamlet."

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**CHART #II-3**

**HAMLET ADMINISTRATION**
(per Decrees #198 and #045)

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HAMLET CHIEF

DEPUTY FOR ADMINISTRATION
  INFORMATION AND CHIEU HOI CADRE

DEPUTY FOR SECURITY
  MILITARY ASSISTANT (PF)
    POPULAR FORCES
    PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCE
```
c. The hamlet has no budget and no legislative body. Further, the hamlet may have no representatives on the village council. Thus, it is an important function of the hamlet chief and his deputies to see that the village council and the VAC are aware of hamlet problems and interests.

d. Additionally, the Hamlet Chief is responsible for seeing to the execution of central and local government laws, policies and directives, for maintenance of accurate hamlet registers, for certifying routine documents before they are sent to the VAC, and for assisting the village tax commissioner in the collection of taxes. In all of this he is assisted by his deputy for administration. Just as the village chief in early 1969 received operational control over village security forces, the Hamlet Chief was charged with "operational control of the forces placed at his disposal, including PF, in conformance with the village chief's instructions." In this sphere he is assisted by his deputy for security and his military assistant (See Chapter IV for further discussion of hamlet security activity).

19. Training

a. The village government is charged with performing at the local level nearly all of the functions performed by the central government. The limited size of the village administration requires that nearly all of its members be generalists, able to do several jobs at once. Thus, the GVN has placed great emphasis on the training of local officials.

b. In the past such training was rather elementary. It was largely concerned with the proper preparation of paperwork, with a certain amount of political orientation thrown in. In 1969, however, a course was inaugurated at the National Training Center, Vung Tau, which may have a far-reaching impact on the conduct of local government. Four key village officials -- the village council chairman, the village chief and his two deputies -- and all of the hamlet chiefs were to be flown to attend a four-week course in village/hamlet government. They were to receive instruction in various GVN programs, with stress on those activities which had recently been added to the list of village responsibilities. Far more important, however, they were to receive guidance in leadership techniques and executive management and, of course, they enjoyed a unique opportunity to compare ideas and experiences with other village leaders from all parts of the nation.
VILLAGE GOVERNMENT

c. Paralleling the Vung Tau course, wide-gauge courses in finance, taxation, agricultural affairs and land reform, local development and village security operations were being organized in-province. These courses were for lesser village/hamlet officials who could not be accommodated at the National Training Center. They were to follow lesson plans drawn up by the central government and to be taught by cadre trained at Vung Tau.

20. Salaries, Allowances and Fringe Benefits

a. An increase in salaries and allowances averaging thirty-five percent was decreed for village/hamlet officials on 6 May 1969. All village officials receive the same basic salary, 4000 piasters per month, plus a Tet Bonus amounting to a month's pay. Additionally, the more important officials receive a position allowance of from 500 to 1500 piasters monthly. (See Chart #II-4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary</th>
<th>Allowances</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VILLAGE CHIEF</td>
<td>4000 + 3300a = 7300$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILLAGE COUNCIL CHAIRMAN</td>
<td>4000 + 3300ab = 7300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILLAGE POLICE CHIEF*</td>
<td>4638 + 2000cde = 6638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD CADRE GROUP LEADER</td>
<td>3250 + 2880 = 6130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPUTY VILLAGE CHIEF</td>
<td>4000 + 1000a = 5000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEP VILLAGE COUNCIL CHAIRMAN</td>
<td>3000 + 1000a = 4000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMISSIONER (Civilian)</td>
<td>4000 + 500a = 4500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAMLET CHIEF</td>
<td>4000 + 500a = 4500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHIEF SECRETARY</td>
<td>4000 + 500a = 4500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILLAGE COUNCIL SECRETARY</td>
<td>2700 + 1800b = 4500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPUTY HAMLET CHIEF</td>
<td>4000 + 0 = 4000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PF PLATOON LEADER</td>
<td>2300 + 1200a = 3500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VILLAGE COUNCILMAN</td>
<td>0 + 1800b = 1800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Allowances:  
a. Position Allowance  
b. Per diem, Village Council meeting (300$/day)  
c. Rice Allowance (200$)  
d. Cost of Living Allowance  
e. Hazardous Duty Allowance
VILLAGE GOVERNMENT

* Salary of police chief calculated for Sub-Inspector, single, less than three years service.

b. Village councilmen, including the village chief, receive 300 piasters every day the council is in session, up to a monthly maximum of 1800 piasters. Council officers receive a monthly salary in addition.

c. PF, RD Cadre and police are paid according to the wage scales of their respective organizations. They are also eligible for the various fringe benefits (hospitalization, family allowances, death and disablement benefits, etc.) generally paid by their organizations.

d. Village and hamlet officials are, together with their spouses and children, entitled to "available treatment in government hospitals." If killed or missing while acting in the course of duty, a village official's legal kin is entitled to twelve times his monthly salary as compensation.

D. DECISION-MAKING IN THE VILLAGE

The Village Policy

21. It is a pacification and development axiom that small, relatively unsophisticated, usually rural communities are at least as capable, on the average, as higher echelons of government in deciding and managing their own affairs efficiently. This is an idea which has roots in both the Vietnamese and the American traditions. The corollary to this axiom is that insofar as these communities to decide, organize and manage their affairs, popular identification with the community will grow and it will become gradually more resistant to Communist attempts to subvert a basically pro-GVN orientation. This too, has firm roots in experience.

22. Preceding sections of this chapter have discussed the village as an administrative unit -- the lowest level of government. The village is, of course, much more than that. It is a functional community -- a social, economic and political unit. This implies organization and a decision-making system.

23. The village government is but one organ in the decision-making structure of a healthy village. Others would include, typically, a socio-economic hierarchy
represented in the village cult committee, the structures of organized religion, an "intellectual" group including the village school teachers and other educated persons, and a "military presence," meaning the local RF and/or PF. Additionally, there may be present on the margins special interest groups, such as Parent-Teacher's Associations or Farmers' Associations. Finally, outside the pale but not beyond consideration, is the Viet Cong village organization.

24. It is the presence of all, or most, of these groups in a village that binds a number of families into a village community. It is their interaction which gives a village community its individual character. It is the mutual dependence and overlapping membership of these groups which gives a village community its cohesiveness and stability.

25. Each one of these groups has at its command negotiable assets and sanctions which it can impose. Each one has a set of interests which it hopes to advance. All, of course, are committed to the greater good of the village -- but each defines it in its own way. The Viet Cong's image of the village's best interest obviously differs from the village government's, with the Cult Committee and religious leaders taking alternative positions as well. There are, additionally, a number of more parochial interests to which each group is more or less committed: prestige, influence, security, freedom from coercion, stability, prosperity.

**Village Interest Groups**

26. The Cult Committee:

a. Nearly every village has a cult committee, centered on the village dinh, or communal temple. It is the body which sees to the proper observance, according to Confucian tradition, of ceremonies to honor the protecting spirits of the community. The dinh is the psychological center of the village; here the village's imperial charter is kept. The cult committee may be very large, including several hundred men divided into smaller committees with different functions. It is the premier voluntary organization in nearly every village.

b. Upward movement through the cult committee hierarchy is governed by the Confucian virtues. Thus a man who raises respectful, well-behaved children, who participates in and contributes to village functions, and who farms profitably may expect to be invited, in his old age, to join the village council of notables, the top of the cult
committees. The council of notables represents the collective wisdom and virtue of the community; its advice is always sought and respected, although not always followed.

c. As might be expected, the cult committee, and especially the council of notables at its head, is generally a rather conservative body, intent on maintaining the old traditions and good social order. Its influence may be stifling, but it is more often constructive. Certainly its benign approval is in most cases a necessity for programs aimed at village improvement.

27. Religious Groups:

a. No religion is dominant in Vietnam; the relative strength of the various sects varies from region to region. Buddhists are found everywhere. At the village level they are likely to be of the moderate variety. Catholics of northern origin (1954 refugees) tend to group into homogeneous communities on the fringes of the larger cities, while southern Catholics are spread more evenly throughout the country. The Hoa Hao, a militant and reformed Buddhist sect, are strongest in the western Mekong Delta. The two largest branches of the mystical, syncretist Cao Dai are centered on Tay Ninh and Ben Tre (Kien Hoa). Here and there are small Protestant congregations and exotic groups like the followers of "Dao Dua", the "Coconut Monk," who preaches peace through co-existence and vegetarianism.

b. Generalizations about the influence of the religious groups in village affairs are treacherous. Certainly they have an extremely important effect on the life of every village, but their influence may be variously cohesive or divisive, progressive or reactionary, anti-communist or neutral. Religiously homogeneous Communities, generally northern Catholic, Hoa Hao or Cao Dai, are typically better organized and resistant to Communist inroads. It is highly important to enlist village religious leaders in support of village improvement programs, while guarding against the trap of favoring one sect over another.

28. The "Intellectuals:" The better-educated citizens of a village tend to view themselves as something of a group apart, to be consulted on matters requiring sophistication about the outside world. This is in line with the waning mandarin tradition, to which the school teachers, some of the priests and a few others may fall heir. School teachers have significant influence in educational and cultural matters, generally with support from the village school's Parents'
VILLAGE GOVERNMENT

29. Cooperatives, Farmers' Associations, Labor Unions, Tenant Farmers' Unions: Special interest economic groups are a recent development in Vietnam, and only in a few villages may they be said to wield significant influence, even on economic matters. However, their incidence and influence is likely to grow rapidly as security and stability increase and "modern ideas" flood the rural areas.

30. The Pro-GVN (Civil): Except in enemy-controlled villages, a pro-GVN group is identified in the popular mind. These are the village officials, plus any other resident civil servants or cadre, and their families. Studies show that by virtue of accepting office they detach themselves, in the eyes of their neighbors, from the mass of "ordinary people." The influence and prestige of the GVN in the village is very largely a derivative of the influence and prestige of this "pro-GVN group." That, in turn, depends on a number of factors. On the one hand, there is their honesty, justice and energy in administrating the village. On the other hand, there is their education and their family and social connections. In some villages, the job of village chief has been the perogative of a single family for generations.

31. The pro-GVN (Military): The influence of the RF/PF in village affairs is most often, unfortunately, only a reflection of their possession of weapons and their ability, within variable limits, to use it. RF and PF are usually men of an ordinary rural background drawn from the broad mass of the population. If, however, the village PF or RF have an image as "good soldiers" (i.e., those who do not abuse their ability to extort favors and foodstuffs from the population) and/or if they are successful in protecting the community against enemy incursions, they may acquire some influence springing from gratitude and sympathy. (This was the case when one village voted to spend the whole of its development grant to build PF housing.)

32. The Viet Cong Organization(s):

a. Where the enemy is weak, his village organization is likely to include nothing more than a shadow village government supported by a handful of guerillas living a precarious life in the nearby jungles. He may have the support of few families, generally relatives, but his influence over the community as a whole derives almost exclusively from his possession of force and his proven willingness to use it to attain his ends.
b. Enemy strength at the village level implies a corresponding GVN weakness. The extreme is found in a few areas where the Communists have been strong ever since the 1930's; here a revolutionary tradition has been passed down from father to son and the characteristic village interest groups discussed above (paragraphs 25 to 28) have been supplanted by mass organizations which preserve much of the outward form but are thoroughly meshed into the enemy war machine. These are the Liberation Farmers', Youth, Women's, etc. Associations, and also, sometimes, organizations of "patriotic" Buddhists, Catholics, etc. The glue which holds the entire structure together is the Communist party village chapter, an elite group which typically monopolizes the leadership of the various mass organizations.

c. In 1968 the enemy began a program of "democratizing" his village organizations through the "election" of village and hamlet "Liberation Committees." These elections have been elaborately stage-managed, thoroughly undemocratic and, consequently, seem to have had little impression on the rural population.

d. The Viet Cong village leadership, like their GVN antagonists, generally are sufficiently "a part of the community" to find their higher loyalties frequently in conflict with their loyalty to the village. It is in the village's interest (at least in the short run) that the level of violence remain low and that the demands of both the GVN and the National Liberation Front be accommodated at minimal economic and social cost to the community. Thus in places a tacit accommodated has developed, which institutionalizes GVN control by day and enemy control by night, pending the outcome of the war through decisions arrived at elsewhere.

33. "Ordinary People." In pre-war days, it is safe to say that nearly everyone knew his place in village society. The dislocations and stresses of the past twenty-five years have gravely weakened the village social order. Alienation and, consequently, personal opportunism have increased. Many ordinary Vietnamese have found it increasingly difficult to trust their neighbors.

34. Conclusion:

a. Numerous interest groups typically are present at the village level. Some, like the village government and its Viet Cong shadow, are "official" and clearly incompatible.
Others are unofficial social or economic groups through which both the local GVN and NLF can hope to influence the bulk of the village population. It is the leaders of all of these groups, plus the followers whom they influence, that comprise the village governmental organization, or decision-making structure. War and socio-economic change have acted to weaken and divide the village governmental organization during the last generation, rendering leadership and decision-making more difficult.

b. Reintegration of the village governmental organization is a desirable and attainable goal, a goal which the GVN has designated "the revival of Community Spirit". Necessarily, the Viet Cong must be excluded, for their purpose is simply the manipulation of the government organization for ends which ultimately must result in the government organization's destruction. Leadership must come, for the present, from the "pro-GVN group" -- the village government. It cannot function effectively, however, unless it is able to enlist the active support of those village leaders who typically have stood more or less apart: the notables, the religious leaders, the teachers, the progressive farmers. Decree #45, expanding the assets and authority available to the village government, was a great step forward -- particularly its integration of the GVN civil and military presence at the village level and its emphasis on wide participation in development planning.

The Leadership Role of the Village Authorities

35. A village chief can play, in the reorganized village structure, a catalytic leadership role. He has at his disposal:

a. Access to higher GVN authority, which is able to supply needed resources, redress grievances.

b. Access to American advisors, potentially a fruitful source of material assistance.

c. Personnel -- the VAC; the village security forces, the RD Cadre.

d. Means and authority to help villagers solve personal and group problems, through allocation of village resources, arbitration or as an intermediary with higher authority.

e. Ability (and in some cases authority) to invoke sanctions against non-cooperating villagers, including
blacklisting and harassment.

f. Legitimacy, deriving initially from his election and from the popular image of the GVN.

g. Prestige, initially derived from his social status and his election, but ultimately dependent on his effectiveness in using leadership tools without frequent resort to sanctions.

36. Ironically, attitude surveys indicate that villagers in general have very low expectations of the village government. All too frequently a village official's merit would be assessed by a reply like "He's a good (bad) official. When we need documents he gives (does not give) us any difficulty." This reflects what might be termed the rock-bottom minimum role of village government: the provision of necessary documents and the maintenance of sufficient defensive capability to secure a village office. Except in those areas where the enemy remains a significant threat twenty-four hours a day, village governments -- elected or appointed -- are capable of far more. Where they are not working close to the limits of their capabilities, it is the function and responsibility of higher authority (generally the district chief) to step in and insist that they do so.

37. Given even a mildly favorable situation, skillful and energetic village leaders make the difference between a dynamic and an inert village community. The leadership group may be as small as the village chief and the village council chairman, but it will be more effective if it widens, as appropriate, to include not only the village council and village officials, but also spokesman for the various interests within the community. There must be an area of consensus -- agreement on where the village wants to go and some idea of how to get there. The village officials must be able to play the roles of politicians as well as administrators. If some horse-trading is necessary to get a local landlord to donate a choice piece of land as the site for a dispensary, so be it.

38. It is of prime importance that the village leaders be, by village standards, honest. It is understood that from time to time an official may divert a tithe into his own pocket. How else, villagers will explain, can the man support his family? What is obnoxious is conspicuous corruption: favoritism, cronyism, demanding bribes from those who cannot afford them, or excessive bribes in general, other injustices, and particularly, accepting favors and
then failing to deliver a quid pro quo. The "good official" is one who limits his take to that necessary to maintain himself and his family properly and uses any other windfalls to help the community, particularly its less fortunate members. To be able to function as a leader, rather than simply as an administrator, it is essential that a village official have a reputation for integrity.

39. Finally, the village leadership must have strong and dependable support from above. Training and orientation to government programs are only the first step. Mutual confidence must develop between the village leadership and the district and province authorities, of the sort which will:

   a. Minimize non-adherence to the chain of command (e.g., either the district chief's giving orders directly to elements under the village chief's operational control or the village chief's going over the district chief's head);

   b. Promote fast and positive response to the legitimate needs of the village (e.g., such things as approval of personnel recommendations, approval of popularly-supported development proposals, effective tactical and logistical support of village security forces);

   c. Minimize bureaucratic delays;

   d. Permit an overall increase in government effectiveness by adjusting the span of control to reasonable dimensions; and

   e. Maximize the prestige of all GVN leaders within their respective spheres of authority.

40. The advisor -- particularly the MAT or district-level advisor -- may play a very constructive role. He must be careful never to involve himself so completely in local relationships of authority that he becomes conspicuously partisan. However, in many subtle ways he can encourage the growth of responsive and energetic village leadership which is positively and patiently supported by province and district authorities.
Village Economy and Finance

"Prosperous People Make a Strong Nation"

("Dan Cuong, Quoc Trang")
Ancient proverb.

A. SUMMARY

1. Technological advance is rapidly bringing the Vietnamese rural economy into the modern world. Despite the war, many localities are prospering through diversification into secondary crops, the introduction of improved rice and livestock strains and the widespread adoption of mechanical aids. The return of peace is likely to bring about a general revival, making the Republic of Vietnam once again a major exporter of foodstuffs.

2. In addition to planning for the postwar period the Government of Vietnam is forging strong links between local government and the local economy now. Whereas in the past all locally collected taxes were sent to Saigon, to be dribbled back to the provinces and villages, taxation is now being decentralized. Similarly, in recent years villages have been delegated increased authority over their budgetary and fiscal affairs, a development which is likely to continue. The technical capabilities of village government have been expanded, to help bring government services to the lowest level of rural society. Finally, authority and responsibility for the management of village development programs has been lodged at the village level.

3. In finance and economy, as in administration and security, the objective is to make the villages full partners in the pacification/development effort. A prerequisite is reform of fiscal and management policies which have hitherto throttled low-level initiative. Simultaneously local managerial skills must be upgraded. In both respects, the 1969 Village Self Development Program may be regarded as the forerunner of comprehensive modernization of the village budgetary process.
B. THE VILLAGE ECONOMY

4. The Village Within the National Economy

a. Despite some twenty-five years of intermittent conflict, the rural communities of Vietnam are today far more closely tied economically to the cities. Wherever a truck or a junk can go, city products and imported goods may be found for sale. Some village crafts are gradually dying out; why buy a palm-leaf hat or an earthenware bowl when a plastic version is cheaper and lasts longer? The war has, to an extent, depressed the agricultural sector, insofar as land (principally riceland) has been abandoned for lack of security or labor. This is offset, however, by a dramatic expansion of truck-farming and animal husbandry and by flow of remittances from sons and daughters who have left the villages for the army and for jobs in the cities and towns.

b. Even in the distant past, villages were never wholly self-sufficient. Natural advantages dictated regional specialization, thus one district would become famous for pottery, another for nuoc mam, another for weaving. Improvement of land and water transportation nets during the colonial period made possible further specialization in brick and charcoal making, plantation products, vegetable and fruit-growing, special strains of rice, and so on.

c. With the exception, perhaps, of cottage crafts, the return of peace is likely to bring about a general revival of the rural economy, turning South Vietnam once again into an important exporter of foodstuffs. A high-level study group concluded in 1969 that the nation could export, with the benefit of a massive project to control the waters of the Mekong river, some 12,000,000 tons of rice per year within the foreseeable future. (The previous export high is some 3,000,000 tons, set in 1939). Vigorous prosecution of the land reform program and expansion of agrarian credit institutions will help ensure that prosperity is passed onto the tiller.

d. Long-run prospects for the rural economy are thus highly favorable, particularly since the GVN has, despite the war, laid the groundwork in its economic planning. Short-run gains are also being emphasized, to capitalize on increasing security provided by the pacification program. Programs of agricultural extension are increasing yields of rice, soybeans, vegetable crops, chicken
and pork at a rate which astonishes many economists. A far-reaching land reform program will move into the implementation phase in 1970. Programs such as these are the government's best propaganda in the countryside. They demonstrate to the farmer in very practical fashion the government's interest in his welfare.

5. Village Economic Types

a. It is possible, for purposes of analysis and program planning, to classify villages into three typical economic types: Urban, Rural/Commercial and Rural/Agricultural.

b. The Urban Village: Agricultural activity is negligible; nearly all of the work force is dependent on salary or entrepreneurial income. Population density is high, and totals 20,000 or more. The village is a primary distribution point for a large surrounding area. Typically the village is a major administrative center (e.g., province town or corps capital) and may be part of an urban area which includes all or part of neighboring villages as well. There is likely to be some light industry, such as textile mills, food processing plants and sawmills. Minimal services, such as power, paved streets and adequate drainage are usually provided, but water and sewage may not be. Usually there is a small professional community—doctors, lawyers, educators and so forth. Invariably there are good secondary schools. Theatres, hotels and gas stations are common. The village budget is probably 4,000,000$ or more per year. However, in 1965 only 21 villages raised funds by local taxation in an amount greater than 1,500,000$.

c. The Rural/Commercial Village: Although agriculture is a significant part of the village economy, there is a commercial core area centered on a large market. Population density is high in the core and total population is probably 6000-20,000. Most city goods are available the market area serves as a secondary distribution point for a dozen or so surrounding villages. The village is likely to be a district seat and may be a smaller province seat. There may be some specialization in cottage industries, brick and pottery-making, etc. A modest level of public services (electricity, some paved roads) is typical. A high school is probably present, but is unlikely to offer the full seven-year program. A gas station is likely but
hotels and theatres are not. The village budget is probably from 1,000,000 to 4,000,000$ per year. In 1968 only 55 villages raised funds exceeding 500,000$ by local taxation.

d. The Rural/Agricultural Village: The village economy is dominated by agricultural pursuits or fishing. The population, generally below 8,000 is typically widely dispersed in hamlets and individual clusters of houses (unless there has been a relocation for pacification purposes). There is a small market, normally with a few dry-goods stores and soup shops nearby. Village roads are rarely paved and the only likely service is a small electric power generator at the village center. Education typically stops at the elementary level. Village budget revenues are probably less than 1,000,000$ per year. In 1968 a majority of the villages in the country raised less than 200,000$ per village through local taxation.

e. Variants: Villages where forest-exploitation is the principal economic activity typically are clustered tightly along main roads but otherwise resemble the rural/agricultural type village. Plantation villages typically evidence a higher degree of planning and services, provided by the plantation management, but otherwise resemble the rural/agricultural type also.

C. VILLAGE BUDGETING AND FINANCE

6. Introduction

a. Three levels of government are empowered to make budgets: the central government, the provinces and the villages. Village fiscal autonomy, however, has existed more in theory than in practice. A pattern of centralized control and fiscal conservatism was built into the Vietnamese administrative system in pre-war years. Effective pacification management, however, demands flexible and decentralized decision-making. In short, judged in terms of present-day requirements, a situation of "overcontrol" has existed. The authority granted operational levels should be made commensurate with the responsibility assigned.

b. Regarding village government, the 1969 pacification/development innovation (especially the Village Self-Development Program and the provisions of Decree 045, "Reorganization of Village and Hamlet Administration") are very constructive first steps. In keeping with the overall objective of making the village an equal partner in the pacification/development effort, the GVN has begun modernization of low-level fiscal procedures and policies. In Decem-
In the late 1960s, joint studies by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Finance led to the addition of a tax commissioner to the village government, improvement of the formula governing GVN subsidies to village governments, and development of training courses in taxation and fiscal administration. These training courses are to be given in-province to appropriate village officials in the second half of 1969.

The Central Pacification/Development Council (CPDC) studies proposals for further reform. It is generally agreed that a great deal more work is necessary, especially with regard to the jungle of regulation and custom governing ordinary village finance, discussed below, paragraphs 7-17. There are four major objectives:

1. Development of incentives to increase tax collections;
2. Simplification of fiscal management;
3. Increase in village budgetary authority;
4. Improvement of the fiscal and tax management skills of village and province officials.

d. The local advisor has a continuing role to play in the elimination of non-essential, informal restraints on village authority to manage village affairs. Study of the discussion of village finance which follows will suggest many lines of inquiry which, after research at the village level, may be followed up with counterparts. District and province deputy chiefs for administration and finance service chiefs will prove fruitful sources of information and ideas.

The Budgetary Process

7. Under present law, the village budget is established and approved as follows:

a. Generally in September, Directorate-General of Budget and Foreign Aid (DGBFA) sends to the provinces guidelines and instructions on the general policy which is to govern the making of village budgets in the following year. The provincial Finance Service issues a circular which relays these instructions to the districts, which in turn inform the villages.
b. The Village Administrative Council compiles the village budget, using standard forms provided by DGBFA. Generally the budget will be prepared by the village chief for administration, under the direction of the village chief. Bids for the operation of concessions (markets, slaughterhouses, fishing rights, etc.) are organized. Meanwhile, an attempt is made to estimate accurately receipts and expenditures in the coming fiscal year in each of many categories. This is usually done by averaging the receipts or expenditures in each category during the previous three years and then adding for anticipated changes. The complete draft budget must balance.

c. The draft budget is submitted to the Village Council for approval, together with a State of the Village' report. The council may make changes in any category, but the planned expenditures and receipts must balance.

d. After approval by the Village Council, the draft budget is transmitted to district for certification. The district may return the draft budget to the Village Council with recommendations for changes or it may forward it to the province Finance Service.

e. The province Finance Service checks the draft budget. It may return the draft budget to the village with suggested changes or may forward it to the Province Chief.

f. The Province Chief may return the draft budget to the village with suggested changes or may give it final approval, in which case a copy is returned to the Village Council for implementation. The entire process should be completed by 1 January, the start of the fiscal year, but delays of several months more have been common.

8. In addition to overall approval of the budget, the law requires that the province chief approve separately a great many budget items, generally those involving a total cost of between 100,000$ and 500,000$. In some provinces the province council participates in these decisions. Most items involving costs of more than 500,000$ must be approved by the concerned Saigon ministries. These requirements are outlined in Chart #II-21.

Revenues

9. The GVN subsidy for village and hamlet official's salaries is the largest single item of revenue for village
expenses. However this money is not entered into the village budget. Taxation of concessions (Markets, slaughterhouses, fishing rights, etc.), comprises what is probably the largest local tax revenue item in most village budgets. Next in importance are the business license tax (Chapter One), and revenue from rental of communal land (Chapter seven). In the rice land and mixed cultivation land taxes are a great potential revenue source, but for the most part are far from being fully exploited. Ninety percent of the villages show income from fees for issuing documents and papers (Chapter Six).

(See Chart#III-1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Budget Chapter</th>
<th>Percentages**</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Land and Business License Tax</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Direct Taxes</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Public Property Occupancy</td>
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<td>4. Miscellaneous Taxes</td>
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<td>5. Concessions</td>
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<td>6. Administrative Services (Fees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Rental of Public Property</td>
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<td>9. (a) Subsidies</td>
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<td>(b) Contributions and Surplus</td>
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<td>10. Delayed Collections</td>
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<td>Title II: Unforeseen Receipts</td>
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<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

* See Chapter II, paragraphs 9 and 10.
** Percentage figures for various budget chapters very widely from village to village. Business License taxes, for example, comprise an average of 30% of the revenues of an "urban village", but are negligible in a "rural/agricultural" village. Most "urban" villages receive no GVN subsidy, but subsidies may make up 90% of the revenue of a poor rural village.

10. Explanation of Revenue Items in the Village Budget.
a. Chapter 1: Land Tax

There are three types of land tax: (1) a tax on rice fields, (2) a tax on mixed cultivation lands, and (3) a tax on improved and unimproved lands in urban centers and on all other improved land (i.e. occupied by building or structures) throughout the province. Revenues from the first two taxes are reserved exclusively for the village budget, while revenues from the third are reserved for the province budget. This third tax is legally levied on every taxable structure in the province, whether located in a heavily populated village or in a small isolated hamlet. Not all residential structures are taxable, e.g. straw huts and certain other light residential construction.

Rice Land Tax: Land is classified in one of six grades on the basis of average production (per crop). The GVN has established minimum and maximum rates for each grade; province chiefs then determine the specific rate within these limits.

Mixed-Cultivation Land Tax: Land used for agricultural purposes other than rice farming is called mixed-cultivation or "garden" land. Like rice land, mixed-cultivation land is classified into one of seven grades for tax purposes and maximum and minimum rates are fixed by the GVN. The Province Chief then determine which crops will be placed in each category (e.g., rubber is usually in the "special class", tea in the "1st Class", etc.) and fixes the specific rates for each class.

COMMENTS: GVN agricultural land taxes are extremely low. As rates are fixed, inflation has caused them to decline as a percentage of overall village revenues. In recent years they have averaged about ½ to 1% of the value of production. Further, through lack of up to date land registers, insecurity and absentee landlords, only a small fraction of the potential land taxes have been collected in recent years. In contrast, the enemy has rather effectively taxed rice at rates varying from seven to 30 percent of the value of production (depending on a family's ability to pay and its political standpoint).

b. Chapter 1: Business License Tax

(1) Basically, this is a central government tax. However, provinces are allowed additional centime or override up to a maximum of 100%, autonomous cities are allowed up to 200%, and villages have the authority to
request the Province Chief for an override to a maximum of 100%. The village rates are usually set by the Province Chief on a district boundary basis, but may apply province wide. The actual village override percentages range all the way from 25% to 100% (6)

c. Chapter 2: Direct Taxes

Direct taxes include a variety of minor levies including taxes on bars and restaurants, on vehicles, domestic animals and boats, and taxes for garbage removal, street lighting and cleaning. Most villages use only the animal and boat taxes. They have generally been prevented from using the bar and restaurant taxes by the provinces.

d. Chapter 3: Public Property Occupancy

This usually minor item includes taxes for encroachment on to highway right-of-way, river banks and sidewalks and taxes on the mooring of boats and vehicle parking. There is a special tax for the construction of verandas and balconies. These taxes are usually collected by the bidding system (see below, sub-para f.) The province usually utilizes this income source. Not more than 100 villages in the country showed any income from Chapter 3 items in 1968.

e. Chapter 4: Miscellaneous Taxes

This chapter, nearly always a minor item, includes taxes on theaters, billiard parlors, etc.

f. Chapter 5: Concessions

This important chapter includes revenues from the exploitation of markets, slaughterhouses, docks, electric power and water supply concessions. Concessions are established by public competitive bidding, usually yearly, for the right to manage the village market (and thus collect fees from individual vendors), to fish in ponds and sections of canals and rivers, etc.

g. Chapter 6: Administrative Services

All stamp fees (for legal documents), fees for sale or exchange of property, miscellaneous fines and fees for official services are recorded in this chapter.
h. Chapter 7: Public Property

(1) The importance of the public property chapter in the village budget varies widely, depending on the amount of public land owned by a village. This chapter includes income from the sale or transfer of village-owned property as well as rentals.

(2) The rental of public agricultural land is governed by criteria established by the GVN. Land must be rented directly to an individuals, at a rent of 15 to 25 percent of average production. The maximum individual rental is three hectares in I and II CTZ and five hectares in III and IV CTZ. Leases are ordinarily made for five years, but may be recalled by the village for a public hearing with six months' notice. Preference is given (in order) to the following classes: (1) Disabled soldiers or families of dead soldiers; (2) The families of other war victims; (3) Combat youth (PSDF); (4) Veterans; (5) Tenants or other small farmers.

i. Chapter 9: Subsidies (there is no Chapter 8)

Most villages receive a subsidy from the central government. Under a 1969 law the subsidy formula was revised so that the subsidy is reduced progressively by one piaster for every additional two piasters in revenue. The maximum subsidy (for a village with organic revenue of 200,000$ or less) is about 1,500,000$ (See Chart III-2)
FORMULA: Below 200,000$ in village tax revenues, GVN bears full cost of village payroll. Above 200,000$, salary subsidy is reduced by 1$ with every 2$ increase in tax revenues.

Chart is calculated for village with payroll of 1,500,000$/year (full staffing).

j. Chapter 9: Contributions and Surplus

Also included in Chapter 9 are any bequests, legacies or voluntary contributions received by the village council and any surplus (or deficit) brought forward from the preceding year.

k. Chapter 10: Delayed Collections

This chapter includes amounts due from previous years which the village has some hope of collecting.

l. Title II: Unforeseen receipts

A hodgepodge of incidental receipts, including donations and bequests. Title II is of minor importance.
11. Collection of Revenue

a. Before the establishment of the separate positions of Tax Commissioner and Finance Commissioner (April 1969), the Deputy Village Chief (also Finance Commissioner) was likely to be the most overworked official in the village. Generally revenues were not aggressively pursued, for several reasons. First, the GVN subsidy formula prior to April, 1969, was such that increase in revenues resulted in an equivalent or greater decrease in the central government subsidy. Second, there was conflicting policy guidance as to the desirability of aggressive taxation in pacification areas. Third, village officials often had only a rudimentary education in fiscal operations and were baffled by the complexity of GVN and province regulations. Fourth, insecurity and consequent refugee movements scrambled the land tenure situation and few villages were able to maintain up-to-date Land Registration Books.

b. The current subsidy formula has been discussed above, paragraph 10 i as Chart #III-2 shows, this formula should act to encourage villages to expand local revenues. Moreover, the GVN now attaches great importance to increasing village tax revenues and to the villages' using these revenues in ways which visibly benefit the villages. The creation of the tax commissioner post, and the in-province training courses in Taxation and in Finance scheduled for 1969 are indicative. Finally, surveys indicate that in the later stages of pacification the revival of trade and agriculture, coupled with better security, makes possible a significant strengthening of the village tax base.

c. Procedures

(1) Each time the village tax commissioner makes a collection, he must give the tax-payer a stamped receipt from a standard GVN collection book (printed by province). Receipts are serially numbered and matched by a corresponding stub in the collection book. One book is maintained for village tax receipts and one book for the collection of taxes for province and the national budget. A running account of receipts is maintained to the left of the stubs. Issue of these books is strictly controlled by the district tax office.

(2) At the close of business each day the tax commissioner turns over his collections and a summary account to the finance commissioner, who is also the village cashier. The finance commissioner signs for the funds and periodically transfers them from the village safe
to the province treasury. Taxes collected for province and the national budget must be deposited twice monthly. Village funds, up to a maximum of 30,000$ (50,000$ in province and district towns), may be kept in the village safe.

(3) The procedure for deposit of funds in the Province Treasury is complex and generally runs through these steps:

- Village Finance Commissioner makes out deposit slip.
- Commissioner takes money and deposit slip to District Chief for visa.
- Commissioner takes money and visaed deposit slip to Province Finance Service Chief for checking as to proper form.
- Commissioner takes money and checked and visaed deposit slip to Province Chief for further visa.
- Commissioner takes money and visaed, checked and visaed deposit slip to Province Treasury
- Province Treasury issues receipt and enters amount in Rural budget account book for the village making the deposit.

**Expenditures:**

12. There are four chapters on the expenditure side of the village budget, subdivided into many articles. The regulations require minute accounting. In preparing the yearly budget estimate, the VAC is required to calculate expenses very carefully for each chapter. For instance, if at the end of the year, the village has surplus funds, these monies may not be used to purchase equipment or supplies needed in the following year. Nor may they be used to meet current needs if these needs were not anticipated in preparing the budget. Mid-year transfers of funds from one chapter to another require approval of the village council and the province chief (and usually the informal approval of all intermediate authorities as well); hence this rarely occurs. Procedures for withdrawal of funds from the province treasury are exceedingly complex and in effect impose an additional control on village finance. Like the revenue side, the expenditure side of the village budget reflects a French-era preoccupation with higher-level control at the expense of
the local flexibility necessary for effective pacification/development operations. As such, by 1969, emphasis was being placed on the reduction and simplification of these controls.


a. Chapter 101: Allowances

This chapter includes only three items: Meeting allowances for the village council; miscellaneous allowances for VAC officials; and VAC meeting and travel expenses.

b. Chapter 201: Village Administration

Articles 13-19 cover salary and fringe benefit payments for village/hamlets, a very large item. Articles 31-39 cover routine expenditures for administrative operations. This includes office rental, utilities, transportation and POL, office supplies and maintenance. "Food for temporary detainees" and costs of "ceremonies and receptions" are budgeted under Article 38. Grants to "public common interest facilities" (schools, community power cooperatives, etc.) are provided for under Article 42. Welfare grants to individuals are budgeted in Article 51 and grants to "charitable associations" in Article 52. "Transfers" to other villages or to hamlets are found in Article 53 and taxes owed the central government are entered in Article 54. Articles 71 and 74 cover purchase of fixed and movable property, respectively. Article 81 is loans given; Article 83 is repayment of loans received.

c. Chapter 701: Public Works and Development.

The development chapter of the regular village budget is usually relatively small. Generally villages budget only enough to maintain existing facilities and depend on self-help/self-development grants for further expansion. Articles 13-19 cover the wages of skilled labor and other maintenance personnel. Operating expenses are budgeted in Articles 31 and 33; maintenance and routine repairs in Article 73 and procurement in Article 74.

d. Chapter 901: Miscellaneous Expenses

Chapter 901 provides for unforeseen expenditures
e. Title II, Chapter 902: Extraordinary Expenditures

The use of any extraordinary (windfall) receipts must be provided for in this chapter.

14. Disbursement

Study of nearly any recent village budget will reveal that once housekeeping expenditures are accounted for, very little remains. In the poorer villages, collections do not even begin to equal the cost of salaries and other administrative overhead; these villages are dependent on large GVN subsidies. Implementation of the revised subsidy formula (paragraph 10-1, above) on 1 April 1969 should make more funds available for improvement of facilities and for public works. Eventually all development effort should be funded through the village budget; this is possible now only in the most prosperous villages. Until a combination of incentives and fiscal reform makes a significant increase in village revenues possible, extraordinary funding arrangements such as the Village-Self-Development (VSD) Program (discussed below, paragraphs 19-29) will be necessary. It is likely that in 1970 and afterward the size of these grants will be at least partially contingent on a village's success in generating its own development funds, however.

b. Procedures

(1) Approval of Expenses

Under current legislation (April 1969), villages may spend up to 100,000$ without higher-level approval, vice the previous 50,000$ limit. The village chief is authorized to meet routine expenses, if provided for in the budget. By law, all expenses relating to the lease or rental of real estate or property, to the purchase, transfer or exchange of village property or to the construction and maintenance of village public buildings must be approved by the village council. As shown in the para.17 below, these expenses are subject to audits. Expenses in excess of 100,000$ and less than 500,000$ which involve the management and construction of public properties (as above) must be personally authorized by the province chief, generally after a review by the district chief. Above 500,000$, the district and province chiefs review the proposal, after which it is transmitted to the concerned Saigon ministry for authorization. The practical effect of this procedure, although unintended, is to discourage villages from attempting large scale improvement schemes.
(2) Salaries

Management of salary payments is relatively simple. The deputy village chief for administration draws up a monthly pay schedule based on salaries established by GVN decree (see Chapter II, para. 19), including a certificate attesting to the attendance of village councilmen at meetings during the month. The pay schedule is countersigned by the finance commissioner and then is entered in the village ledger. It is signed by each official as he receives his pay. Generally, recruitment of personnel is allowed only when allowance has been made for a position in the village budget. By decree, province and district are not allowed to ask villages to bear the cost of salaries of province and district personnel. However, the practice appears to be common.

(3) Public Works and Supply

Public works and purchase of materials funded under the regular village budget are subject to progressive controls as the cost increases. Approval authority was discussed above (paragraph 14-b(1)). In addition.

1. Contracts of 20,000$ or less: No bidding or estimates required.
2. Contracts of 20,000$ to 100,000$: Three estimates are required. Prices are checked by a committee chaired by village council chairman, with another councilman and the village deputy for administration as members.
3. Contracts of 100,000$ to 200,000$: Three estimates are required. Generally contract is made by a committee chaired by a representative of the province chief and including a representative of the province finance service, a village councilman and a member of the VAC. Final approval is vested in province chief.
4. Contracts of 200,000$ to 500,000$: As in 3 except that a
Contracts above 500,000$ contracts are paid on the presentation of invoices, once the expense has been approved. Expenses of 20,000$ and above must be checked by committees established as in paragraphs 2 and 3 above. Public Works contractors are paid gradually, as the project progresses. One-tenth of the total payment is withheld until the work is "permanently accepted".

Withdrawal of Village Funds from the Province Treasury

As noted in the discussion of village revenue management, a village may keep only 30,000$ piastres on hand (50,000$ in the case of province and district towns). The rest must be deposited in the province treasury. Withdrawal of these funds is a complicated process. In essence it serves as a further check on village fiscal autonomy, as both district and province personnel have unofficial veto power. First the finance commissioner presents a request to withdraw funds signed by the village chief at the district office for countersignature. He takes this document plus a prepared receipt to the province office. The province chief or his authorized representative keeps the withdrawal request, signs the receipt, and issues to the finance commissioner a draft on the province treasury. At the Treasury Service the finance commissioner turns over the draft and the receipt and receives the required funds.

Auditing and Accounting Procedures

15. Accounts: The village is required to maintain a number of registers, as follows:

a. Receipt Books. In one book all village revenues are entered, and in another all revenues for the national and province budgets are entered.

b. Register of Expenses. In this book the finance commissioner keeps a running account of expenses for personnel, materials and works. The register is closed each month.
c. Ledger of Expenses. In this book the finance commissioner records each expense according to the chapter and article of the budget. It is used to ensure that expenditures for each article do not exceed budgeted amount.

d. Register of Cash. The cash account is closed daily and should tally with the amount on hand in the village safe.

e. Inventory Book. This is an account of supplies and equipment on hand.

f. Land Register and Land Tax Roll. The land ownership record is called a Land Register. The official copy of this record is kept by the Province Land Affairs Service. The Province Land Affairs Service sends a copy of each transaction of land ownership change to the village and the village enters the change in its copy of the Land Register. The Land Register has a record of present owners and previous owners with dates of previous transactions, the amount of land owned and a plot map with a lot number.

The Tax Commissioner uses part of the information contained in the Land Register to make up the Village Tax Roll. The Tax Roll contains the owner's name; number of hectares owned; whether it is rice, mixed cultivation or urban land; the category or class of the land; the rate for the class of the land; and, finally, the total amount owed in taxes by the owner. The Village Agriculture Commissioner is required to assist the Tax Commissioner in maintaining correct information as to land for each owner on the tax roll. The Hamlet Chief, who is required to assist the Village Tax Commissioner in the collection of the taxes, also furnishes information for keeping the tax roll current.

g. Business License Tax Roll: The Province Taxation Service prepares the business license tax roll, usually from information sent to the province by the villages. However, in the urban areas, only the Province Taxation Service is involved.

16. Reports

a. Monthly Fiscal Report: The village sends a monthly fiscal report to the District Chief. This report is a complete breakdown of receipts and expenditures and the balance of funds on hand for each village in the District. The Province consolidates the District reports and sends a monthly report to DGBFA in Saigon containing the same information.
b. Quarterly reports: The District makes a quarterly report to the Province of village receipts and expenditures by Chapter, Article and Item. The Province Finance Service Chief consolidates these reports and sends a quarterly report to DGBFA. The fourth quarter report constitutes the yearly report to DGBFA.

c. Fiscal Report to MOI: The Ministry of Interior also requires a monthly report which includes specified financial data. Both MOI and DGBFA check on the subsidy payments.

17. Spot Audits: A principal duty of the Canton Chief, a position now being phased out is auditing village accounts twice monthly, and reporting his findings to district and province. The district chief is directed to check village books at least once each quarter, reporting his findings to the province chief. The province chief or his representative is expected to make occasional unexpected visits of this sort also. Finally, particularly where some irregularity is suspected, inspectors from the Directorate-General of Budget and Foreign Aid or the Ministries of Finance and Interior may be sent to make spot audits.

18. Fiscal Responsibility: Usually, where an irregularity is detected the village is simply ordered to rectify it. However, if it is clear that public funds have been squandered or misappropriated, the authorizing official may be held personally accountable.

D. The Village Self-Development Program

19. The Village Self-Development (VSD) Program was inaugurated in 1969 as a key element of the village-oriented Pacification/Development strategy. It supports two major pacification objectives: the strengthening of village/hamlet government and the stimulation of the rural economy. Further, the self-development program is based on the Pacification/Development principle of Community Spirit.

20. The self-development program was specifically designed to overcome a number of obstacles which handicapped its predecessor self-help programs. (Self-Help programs have been a distinctive element of all nation-building/Revolutionary Development efforts in recent years.) In particular, the self-development program is intended:
a. To insure that development projects directly benefit the people and reflect their aspirations;

b. to foster active participation by villagers in community development planning and execution;

c. to stimulate village leadership into efforts to mobilize organic resources and local contributions for community development programs; and

d. to simplify procedures for local development funding.

21. The 1969 Village Self-Development Program is revolutionary in that:

a. Substantial development grants are given directly to the village governments;

b. Villages are assigned primary responsibility for the planning of all projects and the implementation of those projects with funding of 100,000$ or less.

22. In 1969 the self-development funds were allotted to give every village 400,000$ with an additional 600,000$ provided for villages with elected governments. This was an attempt to focus attention on the importance of village elections and to give elected governments more resources with which to solve village problems. However, in 1970 the fund was allocated on a population basis. Every village continued to receive a basic amount of 400,000$ but then for each increment of 500 people over a population of 2,500, 50,000$ was added to the development fund. The money was taken from the Ministry of Revolutionary Development budget and deposited in accounts for each village in the province treasury. This simplified the usual bureaucratic procedure for expenditure of funds.

23. In 1970 the self-development grants could be spend for two categories of projects: those projects costing under 100,000$ could be approved by the village; those costing over 100,000$ required provincial approval and technical advice. But the decision as to what projects will be selected remains with the village.

24. The self-development program is managed separately by the VAC; it is not part of the regular village budget, described above, paragraphs 7-18 of this chapter. The self-development grant is managed specifically by the village finance commissioner. A program to significantly increase local revenues and the village's ability to spend
them easily should give increasing importance to the village budget during 1970. In this way the self-development grants in time can be replaced by the local community's own tax resources.

25. Development Groups are the fundamental technique for organizing the population in the task of national development. Actual decision-making for development is decentralized to a low action level to insure that development occurs along desired local lines. Through groups greater solidarity will emerge in the village community. Just as the People's self-defense groups link the individual to the national organization for security, Development Groups form a vital web uniting the population with the government through the village... Development Groups will exist for as long as their members feel they are advantageous. The government strives to create conditions to maximize the advantages of group participation.

26. The importance of the Revolutionary Development Cadre role in Village Self-Development can hardly be exaggerated. The 30-man RD Cadre Groups assigned to most villages provide essential fuel and lubricant for the VSD machinery. The cadre are the activists who generate enthusiasm among the village population and who provide the reservoir of added organizational and technical expertise needed to keep the VSD projects moving despite obstacles or frustrations. The subordination of the cadre to the village chief is intended to insure that pacification and development policies and programs are coordinated within the village framework.

27. The self-help programs of former years were characterized in fact, if not in theory, by institutionalized over-control. The selection of projects often reflected a ranking official's conception of what was needed, rather than popular aspirations. Consequently community input was often minimal in both planning and execution and at times the self-help programs took on the appearance of a "numbers game". In contrast, the self-development concept maximizes local decision-making. Success is not to be measured by the number of projects generated and reported to higher authority, but by popular participation and the development of community spirit. More important than the technical excellence or cost-effectiveness of the various projects is the degree to which the village authorities and especially the general population can be intimately involved in the planning and execution of development projects that they really desire.
28. Proper implementation of the village self-development program should result in a significant psychological and economic payoff. Gains will be gradual rather than dramatic, however. Major innovations take some time to filter down to operational levels. Advisors should give forceful and informed support to the decentralization of authority and responsibility which is integral to the self-development concept. Higher-level GVN administrators and pacification planners are strong advocates of the program. Some resistance at middle-management levels may be encountered. Generally, such resistance will take the form of insistence on non-essential extra controls and a generally, cautious attitude.

29. In particular, advisors should use their influence to insure: that village officials receive proper training and guidance in understanding the self-development procedures; that provinces expedite the disbursement of funds and commodities required for village projects; that review and approval of projects subject to provincial overview is not delayed; and that the technical services respond to village requests for assistance in project planning and implementation.

E. Land Reform

30. Land ownership and tenure are a matter of critical importance to the rural Vietnamese. Although the desire for security has eclipsed the desire for land in the last decade, it is nonetheless clear that one requirement for a durable peace is an aggressive program of land reform.

31. A measure of land redistribution and rent controls was accomplished in the early years of the Republic of Vietnam, before the Communist insurgency brought the land reform program to a standstill. Gradually improving security made possible by 1967 a limited revival of this program. By 1969 plans were being made for a much greater effort.

32. In February, 1969, the Prime Minister declared a freeze on land occupancy and rents in newly-pacified areas. The provisions of Circular #33, dated 12 February 1969, include:

a. Returning landlords may not collect back rents nor evict tenants cultivating the land;

b. No new rents can be collected for one year;
c. Any farmer who has occupies a piece of land for more than one year is guaranteed the right to remain on the land as legal tenant of the rightful owner or to become the owner of an equivalent hectarage of SVN-owned land;

d. Former tenants (who had abandoned the land) are accorded priority in the distribution of SVN-owned land.

At about the same time the SVN ordered provinces to distribute by the end of 1969 some 14,7,000 hectares (353,000 acres) of land expropriated from French colonialists which still remained in SVN hands. Eighty-five percent of this land is in IV CTZ.

33. A comprehensive "Land to the Tiller" law was passed by the National Assembly and signed by the President in March, 1970. This was a slightly modified version of the President's original proposal to the Assembly. The program to grant land titles to highlanders was well-advanced by that time as well.

34. Thus in 1970 land reform became a priority task for village governments. Training programs for village officials were planned for each province. A temporary position of land registrar was created to assist the village commissioner for agriculture and land reform in the implementation of the program in certain villages.

F. Agricultural Credit

35. Chronic indebtedness has historically afflicted the Vietnamese farmer. Loan money has been available through private channels only at exorbitant rates - sometimes as much as one half of a farmer's crop. Pawn shops are allowed to charge 3% per month. The SVN's Agricultural Development Bank (ADB), established by decree in 1967, is beginning to meet the demand for development loans. Offices located in every province extend loans at from 5 to 12% yearly interest for the development of agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing and forestry. Surveys indicate that the ADB's activities have speeded the mechanization of Vietnamese agriculture and fishing appreciably by enabling rural entrepreneurs to purchase outboard motors, water pumps and two-wheel tractors. The ADB's requirement that a credit applicant be able to offer collateral has prevented it from extending loans to less prosperous villagers, however. This obstacle will be overcome, according to plans being made by the SVN in mid-1969, through the establishment of a system of locally-managed and directed "community banks". They will be similar to U.S. Savings and Loan Associations and will be supported by the ADB.
G. Refugees

36. As hamlets become secure, many inhabitants, who have fled their homes because of terrorism or dangers of war, return to their original village. The Ministry of Health, Social Welfare and Relief (MHSWR) has a program for helping many of these returnees in the initial stage of re-establishing themselves. This assistance includes VN$7,500 and ten sheets of roofing per family, and six months' rice allowance for each member.

a. To be entitled to these commodities and funds, all that a returnee needs is an official certification of his refugee status. This may be a green registration card which he has formerly received in a refugee temporary or resettlement center. Or it may be a white census form which many displaced persons, who sought refuge outside of refugee camps, have received during a recent nationwide survey. Lacking either one of these official certificates, a returnee can obtain a statement of his refugee status from the Village Administration where he sought refuge. Any one of these certificates entitles a returnee to the benefits provided by the return-to-village program of the MHSWR.

b. If the village, to which refugees return, has a functioning administration, it is the responsibility of the Village Council, and particularly of the Commissioner for Social Welfare and Culture (See Chapter II, Paragraph 15, e) to inform the returnees of their rights and to assist them in obtaining this available assistance. It is urgent that the Provincial Administration be notified of the arrival of returnees so that the Province Social Welfare and Relief (SWR) Chief can immediately check into their refugee status, assist them if necessary in getting a refugee certificate, and present a list of legitimate refugee returnees to the Provincial Administration.

c. Upon approval of the Province Chief, the SWR Chief will take the necessary steps to distribute commodities and disburse funds. This return-to-village allowance will assist the refugees in re-establishing their families so that once again they can become productive citizens of their original village.

37. When enemy action or allied military operations destroy homes or cause injury and death, commodity and monetary assistance is available by reason of the War Victim Relief Program of the MHSWR. As soon as the Provincial Administration is notified of the incident, the SWR Chief
arranges for immediate relief assistance, which includes rice, blankets and cloth. An indemnity is paid for wounds and death. And, depending on the amount of house damage, the owner will receive either VN$3,000 or VN$7,500 and 10 sheets of roofing. It is the responsibility of the Village Administration to inform War Victims of their rights and to help them obtain relief assistance.

38. Another function of the Commissioner for Social Welfare and Relief is to notify the Village Administration of the arrival of refugees who have fled their hamlet because of enemy action and war related dangers. This information is relayed to the Provincial Administration. Immediately the SWR Chief will arrange for relief assistance, which includes rice and money during seven days, or longer if necessary. During this time, the SWR will plan either the return to original village or the resettlement of these refugees.
A. SUMMARY

1. Village-level security elements have two paramount tasks: (a) Defense of the entire populated area against infiltration by small armed enemy elements and (b) Detection and neutralization of enemy cadre (VCI) and other individuals who actively support the enemy. The thorough accomplishment of both of these missions is crucial to successful (i.e., permanent) pacification. Only when a climate of day and night security, including freedom from enemy taxation and terrorism, is present in every hamlet can effective administration and village self-development be expected to follow.

2. Security responsibilities have been delegated increasingly to village governments, and the principal village-level security elements, i.e., Popular Forces, National Police and People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) are now under the operational control of the village chief, as are Revolutionary Development Cadre, which have a secondary security role. It is the responsibility of the village authorities to so coordinate the activities of each of these elements as to insure a unified, village-wide security effort.

3. The active involvement of the entire population in their own defense is a particularly important village pacification objective. This can occur only when each individual perceives that non-involvement is no safeguard and that his own best interest lies in joining with his fellows to resist enemy exploitation. After the enemy's country-wide attacks at Tet, 1968, the GVN placed renewed emphasis on the formation, training and utilization of "people's groups" particularly the PSDF, an armed village/hamlet defense organization.
4. Experience has shown that when local security elements (however weak individually) are closely integrated, when they are able to establish close ties with the population and when they can rely on effective support by province/district when needed, dramatic advances in local security usually result. It is a primary mission of the district military command and of district and MAT advisors to actively, yet unobtrusively, foster such developments.

B. THE VILLAGE AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL SECURITY

5. Although Village Administrative Committee (VAC) have been charged, on paper, with extensive responsibilities in the area of security since 1966, not until recently (1969) has it become common for them to play the leading role which was envisioned.

6. Decree-Law #198 (December, 1966) stated that the village chief, assisted by a commissioner for security, "sees to the maintenance of security and public order in the village; in this respect he has the right to mobilize organic forces in the village and, if required, to request Popular Forces in the area to provide support for security measures" (Article 26). Despite this sweeping delegation of responsibility, the involvement of village authorities in security matters was usually minimal throughout 1967 and 1968. A mid-1967 directive placed Popular Forces in village temporarily under the command of the Village Administrative Committee. In practice, however, this rarely occurred. One one hand, PF platoon leaders were reluctant to take orders from civilians who often had little experience in military matters. On the other hand, many village officials were quite content to remain uninvolved, sometimes on the premise that they were less likely to become enemy targets if they stuck to purely civil matters. District and province chiefs were generally opposed to the directive. Thus it was rarely given more than lip service.

7. In accordance with the strategy of revitalizing village government, the 1969 Combined Campaign Plan redefined the PF-Village relationship unambiguously: "PF, under the operational control of the VAC, will be employed near villages and hamlets from which recruited to provide protection to the people, material and installations." The creation of the People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF), beginning in 1969, placed another asset under the control of many village chiefs. Similarly, steps were taken in later 1968 to stimulate the deployment of National Policemen to the village level under
the control of the village chief. Revolutionary Development Cadre Teams were reorganized and, beginning in January, 1969, deployed in 30-man groups under the operational control of village chiefs. Finally, village government structure was reorganized in April, 1969 (Decree #45). The reorganization did not change the village's statutory responsibility for the maintenance of security. Rather, it gave to the village administration the authority and assets necessary to do the job. (See Chart #IV-1)

8. **First, the village chief's operational control of Popular Forces and all cadre regularly active in the village received the force of law. Second, the village chief received assistance in the execution of these duties through creation of the positions of deputy village chief for security, village military commissioner, deputy hamlet chief for security and hamlet military assistant. The post of village commissioner for security was abolished.**

9. **Deputy Village Chief for Security**

The deputy village chief for security is the village chief's principal assistant for "problems concerning administrative and judicial police, public order, military draft and military affairs." Additionally, he is charged with monitoring "political activities, intelligence organizations, People's Self-Defense Forces, Youth and Sports." Like the deputy village chief for administration, he is appointed by the province chief on the recommendation of the village chief (and with the approval of the village council and the district chief). He is fully responsible for the management of political and military affairs in the village Chief's absence.

10. **Military Commissioner**

The village military commissioner must be a PF platoon leader and ordinarily is the ranking platoon leader in the village. On behalf of the village chief and the deputy for security, he exercises operational control of all village Popular Forces. He is appointed in the same fashion as the civil commissioners, i.e., his appointment is made by the village chief with the approval of the village council, subject to the review of the district chief. However, the military commissioner continues to command directly his old unit and to draw PF pay, supplemented by "one-fourth of a commissioner's position allowance" which is paid by the village budget. Under current laws, this is a negligible 125$ a month.
11. Deputy Hamlet Chief for Security

The deputy hamlet chief for security assists the hamlet chief in the same fashion that the deputy village chief assists the village chief. Like the hamlet deputy for administration, he is appointed by the village chief on the nomination of the hamlet chief and with the district chief’s approval.

12. Hamlet Military Assistant

Like the Village Military Commissioner, the hamlet military assistant is drawn from the ranks of the PF. He is generally a senior squad leader. He is chosen in the same fashion as the deputy hamlet chief. He is delegated operational control over all hamlet PF, retains direct command of his old unit and, under current pay schedules, receives only his PF pay.

13. The district chief may move a PF unit from a village in a case of "military emergency." Further, "the village chief must place the PF under the general control of subsector... in case of an operational plan of an inter-village character."

14. By 1969, the new GVN emphasis on strengthening village government had on paper given village authorities the means "to maintain security and public order" under normal conditions. It remained to be seen, however, whether the various military and paramilitary elements would work in harmony and would respond energetically to village direction. It was also unclear how village authorities would respond to the mandate which had been thrust upon them. It was quite clear, however, that only with sustained command emphasis by district and province authorities could old habits and jealousies be overcome and PF, RD Cadre, National Police and PSDF be induced to work in concert under village leadership.

C. ROLES AND MISSIONS

15. Each village-level security element has a clearly defined role to play in village defense. Some, such as PF and PSDF, are oriented toward defense against armed intrusion; others, such as the police, are more concerned with anti-infrastructure operation. RD Cadre perform a multitude of special tasks, some of which are security-related. The effective performance by each element of its role is
greatly dependent on the cooperation it receives from other elements. Historically, such cooperation has been the exception rather than the rule; thus forceful leadership by the village authorities and command emphasis at higher levels is imperative.

16. The Popular Forces

a. The Popular Forces, or PF, serve near the villages and hamlets from which they are recruited. They are paid a modest salary. PF are organized into platoons under the operational control of the village chief, who in turn is responsible to the subsector commander (see CHART #IV-2).

b. PF are charged with maintaining a secure zone including the entire populated area of a village. They establish a mobile defense against enemy small-unit infiltration, operating around and between hamlets. Their principal target is the local enemy guerrilla unit.

c. PF coordinate activities with RF or ARVN/FWMAF units assigned AO's farther from the village area. They establish bases as points of departure for operations. They conduct night saturation patrols, ambushes and other anti-guerrilla tactics. PF further conduct limited daytime operations, such as small sweeps, attacks on enemy tax points or caches, and in support of the National Police, assist in document checks and searches. If RD Cadre are present in a village, PF assist them in training PSDF. If there are no RD Cadre, the PF are charged with this training mission.

17. People's Self-Defense Forces

a. The PSDF are unpaid citizens who serve as a village/hamlet defense force. Ideally, every able-bodied man in the village other than those in regular military service is an active PSDF member. PSDF receive rudimentary training and serve within their own hamlets. Each PSDF member stands guard about one night in three. PSDF are usually organized into 107-man elements under the direct command of the village chief or his designee. Often, operational control of PSDF elements is delegated to hamlet chiefs.

b. PSDF are responsible for essentially static defense within hamlets, a necessary job which in the past has too often preoccupied the Popular Forces. Now it is the PSDF who establish armed listening posts throughout the hamlet area, freeing the PF for mobile patrolling and ambushes.
CHART #IV-2
POPULAR FORCES
PLATOON ORGANIZATION

(35 Men)

PLATOON LEADER

HQ Element
Asst. Platoon Ldr.
(also PSYWAR)
2 Radio Operators
Medic

Rifle Squad
(10 men)

Squad Leader
Asst. Squad Ldr.

Rifle Squad
(10 men)

Fire Team
Team Leader
Gunner
Asst. Gunner
Rifleman

Rifle Team
Team Leader
Gunner
Asst. Gunner
2 Riflemen
They have direct responsibility for the protection of village and hamlet officials. The PSDF maintain a modest reaction capability and fire-fighting and first-aid auxiliaries. The PSDF organization further opens a convenient channel for reporting information of possible intelligence value. (See para 37, below, for further discussion of the People's Groups concept.)

18. Regional Forces, ARVN and FWMAF

a. These elements provide security in depth for the pacification effort. They are usually assigned responsibility for the initial clearing of a pacification campaign area, for which responsibility, after large enemy forces have been eliminated or driven out, is transferred to village level forces.

b. The Regional Forces (RF) are classed with PF as "territorial security" forces. Their operations are similar to those of the PF but are normally conducted at a great distance from population centers. Further, the RF are organized into companies and are directly under the command of sector and in some instances under the operational control of subsector. Thus RF commanders are in no way responsible to local village chiefs, but should coordinate with village authorities on matters of mutual concern. RF are usually the primary reaction force for the relief of villages which come under sustained enemy attack.

c. ARVN and RVNAF operations in the hinterlands are expected to hinder enemy attempts to infiltrate large elements into pacification zones and other populous areas. As needed, ARVN and FWMAF units are available as relief and reaction forces in the event of large scale enemy attacks on villages. District officials and advisors may play an important intermediary role between village authorities and the commanders of FWMAF and ARVN units with operational and/or civic action responsibilities in or near these villages.

19. National Police

a. In late 1968, provincial National Police Services were ordered to deploy at least fifty per cent of their strength (excluding NPFF and Special Branch) at district level and below by the end of 1969. It was envisioned that a minimum of six policemen would be assigned to each relatively secure village, under control of the Village Administrative Committee. As security improved, greater and greater responsibility for the maintenance of
public order would be assigned to the National Police, assisted by PSDF, while RF and PF elements were progressively redeployed into less secure areas. As this was a new (and, to some, not readily digestible) concept, it remains to be seen how rapidly and effectively the order would be implemented.

b. Each police subdistrict includes both uniformed and plain-clothes policemen. Uniformed police handle civil functions - investigation of crimes and accidents, registration and classification of the population, control of resources and the like. Plainclothes (Special Branch) police are charged with the establishment and direction of intelligence networks. Where a subdistrict is established, the police chief thus assumes a great many of the responsibilities otherwise discharged by the village deputy for security, his immediate superior. It should be noted that police assigned to subdistrict level are explicitly required to visit every GVN-controlled hamlet of a village at least once weekly. At no time are National Police to be held responsible for a village defense role.


a. National Police Field Forces - NPFF platoons are stationed at district level as the operational arm of the District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Center (DIOCC). These highly-trained combat policemen are available for anti-infrastructure operations at village level as needed. (See Chart #IV-3)
20. Census Grievance Cadre.

Up until 1970 there was a Census Grievance Service with cadre in many villages and hamlets. They were to record popular aspirations and grievances along with intelligence information. Their records may be of great assistance to the advisor.

21. Revolutionary Development Cadre

a. No element of the pacification program in recent years has been so widely discussed - or so often misunderstood - as the "RD Cadre." A cadre is neither soldier nor official (the two classes which the Vietnamese peasant traditionally views dimly). In theory he is a trained political organizer, who works among the common people to win their support for a cause through his deeds as well as his words. He must be highly motivated, politically sophisticated, of exemplary character. Particularly, he must be able to relate his cause to the needs and aspirations of the humblest farmer or fisherman.

b. A purist might find that only a few RD cadre meet this high ideal. He would find, however, that these well-trained black-shirted individuals have a significantly greater rapport with the villagers than other outsiders, in direct proportion to the degree to which they approach the ideal.

c. RD Cadre are organized along paramilitary lines. Previously, a Cadre Team (then 59 men and women) would work in a hamlet largely on their own for as long as six months. The objective was - and still is - to motivate and organize the population to take care of their own defense against the Viet Cong and to raise their living standards with some assistance from the government. This approach often worked well as long as cadre remained present in a contested hamlet, but to a disappointing degree the gains proved transitory. Thus in the last few years the trend has been to integrate RD Cadre operations more closely with other elements of the pacification program. This trend culminated in early 1969 when RD Cadre were reorganized into 30-man teams and assigned to work under the direction of village chiefs in about 1400 contested villages. The 30-man group organization is shown in CHART #IV-5.
**VILLAGE SECURITY**

**CHART #1V-4**

**TYPICAL REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT CADRE VILLAGE ORGANIZATION**

(30 Men)

**RD Group Leader**

**Deputy (also Political Officer)**

- **Intelligence & Research Cadre**
- **Liaison Cadre (2)**
- **Medic**

- **Operational Team (8 Men)**
- **Operational Team Leader**
- **Operational Team (8 Men)**

- **Militia Cell (3 Men)**
- **Development Cell (4 Men)**

*Concurrently Village Assistant for Pacification and Development.

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d. A 1969 restatement of the RD Cadre mission held that "After security has been restored by PF and RF, the RD Cadre will participate in the building and organization of the village and hamlet infrastructure, as well as in the political struggle to lay the foundation for the Village Development Program." None can be assigned unless there is a PF platoon present in support. One RDC group will remain permanently in the village. The leader of this group serves concurrently as the village chief's "Assistant for Revolutionary Development and Political Affairs."
e. RDC "operational teams" (eight men, or more if necessary) are deployed to the less secure hamlets of the village with the objective of working themselves out of a job. The three-man "militia cell" in each operational team plays the primary security role. The militia cell in each operational team plays the primary security role. The militia cell (1) advises and assists the hamlet chief on security and intelligence matters, (2) takes a hamlet census and prepares a hamlet map, (3) attempts to identify hamlet VCI and (4) organizes and trains a People's Self-Defense Force element. When an RDC team moves into a new hamlet it assists in development of local defense capabilities, often in conjunction with PF. As organization and training of People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) progresses, selected PSDF members join the RD Cadre and contribute additional firepower to the defensive system. Once a self-defense force of adequate size has been trained and armed, emphasis is laid on the close coordination of their activities with those of PF and National Police. At this point, the PSDF, PF and police, working as an integrated force, should be capable of defending the hamlet against intrusion by local guerrillas. At this time the RDC operational team prepares to move on to another hamlet and begin anew.

f. Within each 30-man RDC Group are two liaison cadre who operate communications equipment and perform other liaison missions. Each group also has an organic Intelligence and Research Cadre who collects and relays intelligence information developed in the course of RDC operations. This cadre also assists the Deputy Village Chief for Security in the organization and training of People's Intelligence Cells and supervises census-taking activity.

22. Information/Chieu Hoi Cadre

a. Information/Chieu Hoi cadre are assigned at village and usually at hamlet level by the Ministry of Information. They are under the village chief's operational control. Psywar and chieu hoi activities are a continuing responsibility of every village official or cadre; it is the I/C cadre's job to coordinate this effort in accordance with the instructions of the village and hamlet chiefs. Technical guidance is provided by the Information Service (VIS) at province and district.

D. VILLAGE SECURITY OPERATIONS.

23. It is not possible to develop a SOP for village security activities which is universally applicable. None-
theless, when objectives are clearly understood and locally available means are closely coordinated, pacification can be successfully accomplished in the majority of Viet-Nam's villages without the introduction of large friendly units. Experience has repeatedly demonstrated that when local security elements work closely together, when they are able to establish strong ties with the population and when they are able to rely on effective support by district/province, dramatic advances in local security result. In this section some means of accomplishing this are outlined. It must be stressed however that each village security system must be modified in accordance with the particular situation (terrain, degree of security, cohesiveness, size and available resources) of a village.

24. The village government's security role was discussed above, paragraphs 5-11 and 13. The roles and missions of various military and paramilitary elements present or operating in the village were outlined in paragraphs 14 to 21.

25. Four major village security tasks may be identified:

a. To deploy and maneuver village security forces as to provide round the clock protection of the population against enemy incursions or harassment.

b. To destroy undercover enemy village organization by indentifying and detaining enemy agents and active sympathizers.

c. To report to higher authorities in timely fashion intelligence on enemy activity in or near the village.

d. To organize and to motivate the entire population to support the GVN and its security objectives.

Territorial Security

26. Defense in Depth

Village defense may be illustrated schematically, as in the diagram in CHART #IV-5, as a series of contiguous zones, or belts. In each zone a different element is assigned primary responsibility.

a. PSDF man listening posts and organize mobile patrols within each hamlet nightly. Sometime PSDF serve as bodyguards for village or hamlet officials.
VILLAGE SECURITY

b. Popular Forces, freed from static security chores by the PSDF, actively patrol and ambush at night within the populated area of the village, around and between the hamlets. During the daytime they may sweep the fields and nearby jungles, assist the police in document checks and searches, etc.

c. Regional Forces operate much like PF, but farther from populous areas and along LOC's between villages.

d. ARVN/FWMAF operations sweep remote areas and prevent the enemy from launching large-scale attacks on pacified villages.

27. Coordination and Support.

a. No village defense plan, however attractive in theory, can work well in a crisis if the following conditions are not present:

(1) Command channels are clearly established and communication between various elements is rapid and sure.

COMMENTS: (i) It may be desirable, particularly if the village chief or his deputies lack military experience, for the former to designate the military commissioner, who is a senior PF platoon leader, as "field commander" in event of a sustained enemy attack or other emergency.

(ii) Some central, defensible location, such as the PF Platoon Post, should be selected as the site for a simple TOC. Here some interface should be established between the different radio systems used by PF, RD Cadre, Police and Village/hamlet (see Chart #IV-6, Village Radio Net). Additionally, a system of signal flares and runners, usually the youth, should be established to maintain PSDF-PF-hamlet communications.

(2) The various security elements are completely integrated and are well-versed in their roles and a number of contingency plans have been developed and practiced. Fighting positions and barriers have been systematically constructed.

COMMENTS: (i) Care should be taken to guard against assigning roles beyond the capacity of the PSDF. Each PSDF element must be able to depend on rapid
support by an RE or PF platoon. The PSDF should be reinforced immediately upon making contact. A good system of intra-hamlet defenses, including gates which may be used to block off alleys at night, will add greatly to the initial advantage which thorough knowledge of the terrain confers on the defenders.

(ii) Village officials responsible for security should inspect the security forces in each hamlet regularly. District and MATS advisors may find it mutually beneficial to invite the officials to accompany them on occasional inspections.

(iii) Regular village-wide meetings to discuss and coordinate security matters are also desirable. Key village and hamlet officials and the leadership of the PF, PSDF, RD Cadre and police should attend. In this way a "village focus" can develop gradually. Occasionally, district staff officers, US advisors or officers from nearby RF units may be invited to discuss matters of mutual concern.

(iv) A regular and continuous training program, with emphasis on joint exercises by PF, PSDF and possibly police, is highly desirable. At least two hours of field problems and critique should follow every hour of "classroom training."

(3) All village security elements are confident that they will receive, in case of need:

- rapid and effective air, artillery and ground support;
- rapid medical assistance and evacuation;
- prompt (i.e., day-after) resupply.

COMMENTS: (i) District and MATS advisors can make a great contribution in this area. Here again contingency planning makes the difference, and the measures suggested below are simply extensions to the village level of standard doctrine.

(ii) Air and Artillery Support—Defensive concentrations should be plotted and coded for the entire village area with the assistance of village security leaders. Similarly, village security leaders can ensure that fire arrows are in good condition and that each post is supplied with at least a few flares. It is highly desirable that briefings on procedures for air-ground and
NOTES:
1. The Province/District Military Net is always present wherever there is an RF or PF platoon, although equipment is not always up to TO&E strength. The Village/Hamlet Radio System, still in development, is primarily intended for civil traffic but can play a vital security role. RDC communications are somewhat confused following reorganization into 30-man groups. It is anticipated that RDC HT-1's will continue to operate on a separate frequency.
2. Despite TO&E shortages, there are usually sufficient radios within a village to maintain permanent communication between all key elements and points. It is essential that military, VHRS and RDC communications be co-locate at village level. As PSDF have no organic radio, PSDF must maintain contact with other elements through a system of runners or lights (dotted lines).
3. All operators must be trained in radio-telephone procedures and current SOI's. District staff should inspect periodically to insure that communications assets at village/hamlet level are properly distributed and kept in good repair. This is a proper subject for advisory emphasis.
artillery coordination be organized at the village level, preferably with the participation of US advisors and FAC personnel.

(iii) Medical Assistance -
(1) District medical personnel, in cooperation with US medical advisors, may be stimulated to organize village-level inspection and refresher training of PF, RD Cadre and PSDF medics. Such training should stress the use of supplies easily available at village level. (2) It is desirable that one or more helicopter pads be prepared and proper emergency lighting arranged. Alternate evacuation routes from the various hamlets and posts to these landing pads should be determined by village security authorities. The reluctance of US medevac personnel to land if there is no US presence on the ground may sometimes be overcome if an American district advisor accompanies the "dustoff" helicopter. Again, it is suggested that drills be organized. They should be held at night if a VR helicopter or air-craft can be obtained.

Actual landings are unnecessary - it is only necessary that one or more district advisors be able to locate the various helicopter pads at night and, either by relay through the district TOC or by direct air-ground communication, have personnel on the ground light up these pads.

(iv) Ground Support - Contingency planning again is highly desirable. Reaction forces and alternate routes from the village center to outlying hamlets should be decided by village security leaders. Similarly, alternate routes which reaction forces from outside the village might follow should be determined and coded through consultation between district and village authorities. Explicit provision must be made for the securing of these routes.

(v) Resupply - Resupply is a continuing headache. Preferably, a modest stock of standard ammunition, mines and flares should be maintained for emergency issue at all times by the district S-4. Sustained advisory emphasis is highly important.

28. Tactical Concept

b. In summary, the mobile defense concept requires that standing patrols and small ambushes be placed out on enemy avenues of approach. These groups provide an early warning and can delay the approach of an enemy party. The positions are occupied after dark. They are changed each night and, if practicable, during the night. This creates for the enemy a "zone of insecurity" around the hamlet so that he has difficulty in concentrating and attacking a specific target. A reaction/counterpenetration force is held centrally and is ready to move to a number of previously reconnoitered positions to meet the threat. Rehearsal and practice by the reaction force is essential so that positive and rapid defensive measures are taken.

c. Employment of the mobile defense concept usually ensures repulsion of enemy attacks in up to platoon size and that company-plus attacks can be held until reaction forces from district are deployed.

d. RD Cadre should not be employed in a patrolling or early warning role, because of the reduced strength of RDC groups and their increased employment in pacification/development activity. They may be effectively employed in a village or hamlet reaction force, however.

e. PSDF should be trained in the mobile defense concept and may form part of the village or hamlet reaction force. PSDF should never be given sole responsibility for patrolling/early warning activity beyond the hamlet perimeter although well-trained PSDF may be employed in this fashion in conjunction with PF.

f. Within a village, each hamlet/defense force should have an area of responsibility which has clearly defined boundaries. (See, for instance, the map in CHART #IV-5). These boundaries should be changed fairly often to prevent the enemy from using boundary areas to his advantage. It is of utmost importance to define respective areas of responsibility whenever RF Companies, ARVN and particularly FWMAF elements are deployed (permanently or temporarily) within the village area. In general, ARVN/FWMAF tactics and organization are inappropriate to pacification-type operations within populated areas and responsibility for the security of the hamlets proper should remain with PF and PSDF subordinate to the village. If the latter feel that they are likely to be mistaken for enemy by other friendly forces they will rapidly cease mobile defense activity at night-time. Advisors should anticipate such problems and prevent them from arising.
29. Logistical Support

a. Each security element at district level, PF Platoons, for instance, submit requisitions to the district S-4, who in turn draws supplies from the province AD&L Company. (RF Companies, if present, may draw directly from the AD&L Company.) PSDF have been also supplied through the district S-4; this function may be transferred to a system of PSDF "cadre" now being organized.

b. Chapter 6 of the RF-PF Handbook for Advisors (MACV Publication 9313/1, January 1969) supplies further information on RF/PF logistical support. Advisors should, in the course of inspections, be particularly attentive to the adequacy of support to the PF platoons. This is a key morale factor, and deficiencies should be brought to the attention of counterparts. Additionally, deficiencies may properly be brought to the attention of the Village Chief, his deputy for security and/or his military commissioner. They should be encouraged to raise such problems through their own channels.

Anti-Infrastructure Activities

30. It is not sufficient simply to prevent armed forces from entering populated areas. As completely as possible, the enemy must be denied access to the population. His political, finance/economy and intelligence organizations must be eliminated. This is a major task of the village security organization with assistance and guidance from the DIOCC. It is a primary mission of the National Police and the Census Grievance Cadre and an important secondary mission of all other village security elements.

31. Literature is available elsewhere through the Phoenix Program on the modus operandi of the VCI and on methods of attacking it. Thus an exhaustive discussion is unnecessary here and only a few important points relative to village level operations will be presented.

32. The Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)

a. The remarkable tenacity of the Viet Cong insurrection may, in large part, be ascribed to the enemy's success in organizing, either overtly or covertly, portions of the rural population of Viet-Nam in support of his objectives. He has relied on both persuasion and terror, with rather greater emphasis on the latter in recent years. As seen above (Chapter I, paragraphs 7-10) he has focused his effort at the village level, and particularly in the
early years of the insurgency, was able to neutralize traditional village leadership to a large degree. He has substituted, where possible, his own leadership elements, collectively referred to as low-level Viet Cong infrastructure, or VCI.

b. It is the enemy infrastructure which has mobilized rural Vietnamese to enter enemy ranks as soldiers, guerrillas and laborers, to hide and supply enemy units and to provide intelligence on friendly activities. The strength of the enemy's infrastructure, and its importance to him, must not be minimized. Ironically, it is precisely this echelon which is most vulnerable to sustain, comprehensive attack - at the village level. To retain control of the population, the enemy's cadre must remain among them constantly exhorting and threatening. Wherever his grip of fear can be shaken, therefore, the enemy cadre is in mortal danger of exposure and elimination.

33. The Village and the VCI

a. Encouraging as the PHUNG HOANG successes were in 1969, it was clear that the anti-infrastructure program had only begun at village level. The program was notably stronger in urban than in rural areas, and in many cases village and some district authorities displayed a pronounced lack of enthusiasm for the program.

b. Infrastructure elimination at the village level, particularly when accomplished by village forces, is an excellent index of progress in pacification. It indicates that village leaders, and the villagers themselves, have committed themselves decisively to the government cause. Stated another way, it means that the population has come to believe that it has more to gain from the elimination of the enemy apparatus than from continued coexistence with it.

c. Conversely, assurances from village officials that "everyone here is pro-GVN" should rarely, if ever, be accepted at face value. In remote areas this is a firm indication that a tacit "accommodation" may exist between the local GVN and VC authorities. It may be that this is the only course which allows the GVN officials to stay alive. Or, a stable local equilibrium may have been established. There is much circumstantial evidence that local VC leaders, like many low-level GVN officials, often rationalize that "whatever I do, the way is not going to be decided in my village" and that any local escalation would only provoke reprisals without producing any permanent
d. Increased reports of enemy activity are thus, paradoxically, often a sign that the enemy's strength in an area is waning. If the reports are exploited successfully, a sort of momentum can develop. Growing confidence on the part of village security elements and the population at large will lead to more VCI eliminations until the entire enemy apparatus is either wiped out or driven out. Only when this happens can pacification be termed "successful."

34. Elements of a Village Anti-VCI Campaign

A successful anti-VCI program must be built on three mutually reinforcing elements:

- Comprehensive Population Control
- Reliable Intelligence
- Effective Counter-Organization

The last of these elements is also a vital technique in building village cohesion and, as a by-product, support for the GVN. As a security measure, it is discussed separately below, in paragraph 37, "People's Groups." Throughout the discussion of population control and intelligence methods which follow, however, it should be remembered that only effective counter-organization is a reliable defense against the resurgence of enemy organization.

35. Population Control Measures

a. The National Police play a central role in all population control (and resources control) measures, assisted by other security elements as appropriate. As always, thorough coordination is essential.

b. Census. The first step is an accurate census of the population. Each family head is interviewed in some detail by Police, RD Cadre or Census Grievance Cadre. Information and basic biodata is elicited from each family head not only on his own family but also on his neighbors. Census taking usually occurs during the first stages of pacification and may profitably be coupled with the distribution of propaganda and queries on the aspirations of the population. Carefully done, a census will provide a wealth of useful information about a village or hamlet. For instance, the frequency of evasive answers is a good index of enemy influence. The census should also be used to identify potential leaders of village development and self-defense programs. An update to the basic village/hamlet census
should be made following any significant population movement.

c. Mapping. From census data and other observation, the RD Cadre or Police proceed to make a careful map of the surveyed area, showing the location of each house, path, stream, field, orchard and other significant terrain feature. District and MATS advisors will find it useful to secure copies.

d. Documentation. In the middle stages of a pacification campaign considerable energy must be devoted to documentation of the population and for this purpose extra administrative assistance often must be provided by district or province. Where there has been a substantial GVN presence, if only by day, however, most the population will have such essential documents as:

- Personal Identity Cards;
- Family Books (documents listing all inhabitants of a particular residence);
- Voter Registration;
- Draft Registration (as appropriate).

The issuance and updating of these documents is a major task of the village administration and of the police. Additional GVN law requires that permits be issued for the transport of a wide variety of commodities, including food. As a citizen in a GVN-controlled area is virtually unable to move without such documents, the population is willing to suffer much to obtain them.

e. Classification. Another major intermediate step in population control is classification of the population into "pro-GVN," "fencesitters" and "neutralist or pro-communist" elements. Properly done and recorded on the village/hamlet map, this can be an invaluable aid.

g. Checks and Searches

(1) All of the information developed through the census, mapping, documentation and classification process should be retained and used by village security authorities. Combined with whatever intelligence may be developed, the data serves as the basis for a coherent and regular program of stakeouts, searches and document checks.

(2) House searches should ordinarily be conducted at night, during curfew hours. They usually may be carried out by one or two policemen supported by a small
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PF or PSDF element (large enough, however, to seal all exits from a building). Care should be taken that the targets remain secret to all but the operation commander until the operation is underway. House-to-house searches are ordinarily ineffective as the element of surprise is lost. More properly, a few searches of scattered dwellings (either at random or on the basis of intelligence) might well be incorporated in the nightly patrols of PF and especially PSDF elements.

(3) Movement checks are essential to hinder enemy supply activity. This includes not only the often-abused resources control checkpoints on major arteries, but also searches of oxcarts, sampans, carrying baskets and the like of people using paths and streams from the village into nearby fields and forests. This latter task is properly a function of the village security forces. Particularly when the population or a portion of it must regularly go into enemy-dominated areas in order to earn their living, it is important to institute such checks. They should be made on access paths and streams, at least occasionally at some distance from the populated area. In one hamlet of woodcutters it was found for instance that the people, under pressure of the enemy, were caching sandbags full of rice and other goods a half-kilometer outside the hamlet. After their oxcarts had been checked at the village gate, they would pick up the hidden sandbags and transport them to enemy cadre deep in the jungle. A more effective system of checks, while it probably did not stop this traffic entirely, was reported to have at least given the woodcutters an excuse for not meeting the enemy's extortionate demands.

(4) It may be seen that the population control measures described above may be easily abused. Document checks and searches offer opportunity for bribe-taking, while classification has been known to serve as a vehicle for local vendettas among non-communist rivals. District and MATS advisors should be alert to the possibility of such abuses and may often be effective in curbing them. The development of strong local leadership and community spirit, together with the checks and balances inherent in utilizing PF, Police and PSDF jointly, can prove a much more efficient deterrent, however.

36. Intelligence

a. The creation of an effective village intelligence system is simple in concept, sometimes difficult in execution. As in most other village security tasks, strong leadership at the village level is a pre-requisite, Additionally, there must be:
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- a regular, two-way flow of information between the village and the DIOCC, either through the village deputy for security or the Special Branch policeman assigned to the village.

- energetic exploitation of timely intelligence by village forces, augmented as necessary by NPFF, PRU or district intelligence squads.

b. In recent years there has been a proliferation of intelligence networks at the village level. In the same hamlet different individuals - or even the same individual - may be reporting to the district S-2, the Police Special Branch, ED Cadre, MSS and PRU. With some exceptions these agent/sympathizer reports are collated at the DIOCC. Rarely, however, has this collated information been passed back to the village security authorities.

c. Where feasible, it is desirable that village-level intelligence collection be more closely coordinated. The deputy village chief for security is charged with the organization of intelligence networks. He should thus be the principal point of contact between the village government and the DIOCC, assisted by the Special Branch policeman if one is assigned to the village. Specific channels for information reporting should be clearly established. It is most important that each RD and PSDF group leader and each PF platoon leader have clear instructions. All intelligence information developed by PF, PSDF, RD Cadre and village-level National Police should be passed by them to the deputy village chief for security, either directly or through the hamlet deputies for security. The village deputy for security should be responsible for collating this information and passing it expeditiously to the DIOCC, together with his evaluation of it. Where the information is "actionable" by village forces, they should be encouraged to react to it at the discretion of the village deputy for security. District forces should be employed as a reserve to operate jointly with village security forces when needed or to be used when intelligence cannot be exploited conveniently at the village level.

d. In nearly all cases, DIOCC's should give greater emphasis to "feedback" to the village level. For example, the village deputy for security should be briefed as completely as possible on relevant intelligence developed by assets not under village control. He in turn can brief the village chief and other village security leaders on a
need-to-know basis. The reporting of experienced agents and sympathizers can improve greatly when they are assigned specific targets and provided such back-ground information (EEl) as is available on these targets.

e. Intelligence orientation should be given to PF and PSDF periodically. These elements are generally a greatly underemployed intelligence asset. Many advisors consider PSDF, with their extensive family ties, to be potentially the best source of low-level information. Further, studies have shown that the best PF platoons invariably enjoy highly accurate intelligence reporting from sympathizers among the population. Advisors should try to ensure that this intelligence is collected, passed upward and reacted to whenever possible. During PF/PSDF orientation, stress must be laid on capturing enemy cadre, rather than killing them. VCI neutralization competitions have proven effective in some districts.

g. The village and hamlet Information/Chieu Hoi cadre should always form part of the village "intelligence community." Not only do their jobs carry them into areas where useful information can be collected, but also the information cadre can prove invaluable in developing leaflets and face-to-face propaganda themes targeted against local enemy units and personalities.

37. People's Groups

a. The formation of people's groups is a key step in the establishment of permanent village security. People's groups have been discussed above as elements in the political mobilization and self-development process (sections III and IV). Further, the basic organization and security mission of the People's Self-Defense Force was outlined in Paragraph 16.

b. It cannot be stressed too often that political and security objectives are united in the people's groups program. Without an overt commitment from the population in favor of GVN objectives, pacification is hardly distinguishable from military occupation. People's groups, and especially the PSDF, are the vehicle through which such a commitment is begun.

c. People's groups may be formed for any practical purpose whatever. Insofar as these groups flourish the individual is drawn into a larger and basically pro-GVN community. In a contested area, the villager's paramount
aspiration is security; he expresses this materialistically as the freedom to earn his living without threat to his life, his family or his property. Freedom in the abstract, or other ideological concepts, are relatively unimportant. Under certain conditions the villager is willing to join actively with his neighbors to protect life, family and property.

d. People's Self-Defense Groups are most likely to succeed when the villager believes that:

(1) he will be supplied with adequate means (weapons, ammunition, training and support when needed) to defend his interest;

(2) his neighbors will all join and he will not be an isolated target;

(3) he and his neighbors will be allowed to defend their interests against terrorism from any quarter;

(4) the self-defense force is truly a People's Self Defense Force and not a puppet-like auxiliary to the RVNAF;

(5) active participation in the PSDF offers a real opportunity to escape from otherwise interminable oppression and exploitation.

e. Participation in the PSDF, particularly the initial act of accepting a weapon, leads the villager toward a conditional pro-GVN commitment. If, through sponsoring PSDF and other programs, the GVN clearly helps the villager to preserve his life, family and property while the Viet Cong/NVA threaten them, the villager will become pro-GVN.

f. Encouraging this conditional commitment is a fundamental GVN/US objective. It is a calculated risk, for the same weapons may be turned on despotic local GVN representatives or undisciplined government troops. Early experience with the PSDF program indicates, however, that:

(1) where the PSDF concept has been earnestly implemented, village/hamlet security has risen dramatically; the villager has not hesitated to accept arms once he is sure that the conditions outlined in subparagraph d, above, have been met;
(2) once the great step of accepting weapons from the government has been taken a link is established which almost inevitably leads to a greater individual and community willingness to make further pro-GVN commitments.

g. The PSDF is ordinarily the first people's group which is established at the village level. The task should not end there, however. The entire population should be drawn into self-defense efforts. Children, old men and women can be trained to report information of intelligence value and to warn of suspicious developments. Teenaged boys and girls render valuable service as runners and ammunition carriers and can help to establish and maintain an intra-hamlet system of barriers and firing positions.

h. The transformation of a "typical" Vietnamese village into the sort of "combat village" discussed above is by no means an easy task. That it is possible, however, is demonstrated by the dozens of such villages (often solidly Catholic or Hoa Hao) which already exist as well as enemy successes with similar organizational techniques. The keys to success are two: firm adherence to the conditions outlined in subparagraph d, above, and sustained emphasis by village, district and province officials and district and province advisors. This command emphasis must take the form of constructive, patient support and encouragement; the temptation to prod, coerce or meddle into matters which the PSDF themselves or the village as a whole should determine must be resisted.

i. The military role of PSDF should not dominate the organization however to exclude efforts at political mobilization and community involvement. PSDF can only exist successfully where the people are united in support of their community and government. Command emphasis should be placed on PSDF as a community effort.
A. INTRODUCTION.

1. Detailed knowledge of the villages in their areas of responsibility is essential to personnel assigned to district and MATS advisory teams. To a lesser extent, such knowledge is important to civic action and province advisory personnel.

2. This handbook is an aid to personal investigation and to problem solving. Necessarily, it has dwelt on formal structures at the expense of informal relationships and has offered general statements at the expense of specific examples. Throughout, however, it has stressed the diversity of village life, the many variables which make each village a unique community. It is up to the individual advisor to become sensitive to these variations and to modify his strategy for dealing with each village problem accordingly.

3. Section B of this chapter offers some general guidance on the advisory role in village development. Section C is a short discussion of low-level corruption - a problem which every advisor must face at some time. Section D offers some tips on the "style of work" which help to maximize advisory effectiveness at the village level. Section E suggests that a systematic program of information collection will greatly enhance the advisory efforts of district teams.
4. Village problems are but one area — although an extremely important one — of the many functional areas which demand the attention of the advisor. A hit or miss approach accomplishes little. It may even be counterproductive if it generates expectations and then fails to fulfill them. The advisor's involvement in village affairs must be organized, focused, and purposeful.

5. It is essential that the advisory presence in village affairs — as in nearly every activity — be supportive rather than pre-emptive. At all times the advisor must encourage the development of constructive relationships between the village, district and province. This point is stressed because in many cases village officials will attempt to press unilateral relationships on the advisor in hopes of avoiding normal bureaucratic hurdles. Alternatively, he may hope to enlist the advisor as an ally against the district or province chief. Although the district advisor may support his counterpart in urging a course of action upon province authorities, his proper role in conflicts of village and district interests is one of firm impartiality and adherence to establish pacification/development objectives.

6. The advisor can do much to determine whether district and province play a constructive, supporting and encouraging role or a destructive, domineering role in relation to the village. Many district and province officials seem to feel that amplification of village authority and responsibility implies a corresponding diminution in their own status. Through word and deed, advisors must reflect this assumption. The district chief is a key figure in the implementation of the village development strategy. He must be encouraged to adopt a new role. Clearly his job is no longer the detailed direction of village and hamlet activity. He is a general manager. His primary job is to speed the development of strong and viable village governments. The district chief must lead the village officials to accept their new responsibilities and become effective local leaders, as well as administrators. The district chief's task is to coordinate the activity of the village in all areas, to supervise judiciously and to trouble-shoot when necessary, and to ensure that the village receive energetic support from above.

7. Vis-a-vis the village the advisor, like the district chief, must play a judicious, supportive role. This activity should normally be undertaken in concert with his
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counterpart. Emphasis should be placed on supplementing and enhancing projects or programs developed by the villages, rather than pushing one's own ideas, no matter how logical. US resources, as available, should be used as a stimulus to maximum possible mobilization of village and GVN resources.

8. The statutory roles and responsibilities of the various village officials have been discussed extensively in preceding chapters. Advisory influence must be exercised in a manner which reinforces the reorganized village structure. The principle of unity of command must be strictly respected. The village chief or, in his absence, the deputies for security and administration, are the responsible authorities for the entire range of village affairs. Their subordinates, such as the village commissioners, the hamlet chiefs, the PF commanders, the RD Cadre group leader and the police chief, are useful sources of information. They should not be permitted to go out of channels in dealings with advisors, however, any more than this should be encouraged in their dealings with district authorities. For example, no request from a hamlet chief for assistance in a project should be entertained if it has not been countersigned by the village chief or his deputy for administration. If a PF platoon commander wishes an advisor to help him talk the province ADS&L company into increasing his allocation of grenades, the request should be routed through the village chief or his deputy for security. Finally, if village officials request assistance in a matter of some importance, the advisor might quite properly require that the request be approved by the village council before he acts on it.

9. The advisor must function as a middleman between village authorities and US/FWMAF units operating in or doing civic action in his area. It is his job to ensure that these units work through the village and district governments; that their activities are designed to stimulate maximum complimentary effort on the part of the villages. Failure to integrate the operational responsibilities of village security forces and nearby US or FWMAF units is as deplorable a lapse as failure to integrate civic action projects into an overall village development plan. It is desirable to institutionalize relations between village authorities and US/FWMAF elements operating in an area on a continuing basis. The most successful device is the "Community Relations Council" which permits village leaders, district officials, advisors and representatives of friendly units can discuss and solve problems in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and candor.
10. MAT advisors: MAT's are generally assigned to work with a specific Regional or Popular Forces unit for a two to three-month period. Recently some have been assigned to work with PF on a village-wide basis, and additionally to assist the village governments on civil matters. This is likely to continue on a wider scale as more villages assume overall responsibility for their security. MAT team leaders should discuss with their superiors the degree to which they should work actively with the village government or governments in their area of assignment.

C. A NOTE ON CORRUPTION.

11. Corruption is the pervasive vice of the Vietnamese administrative system. Although corruption is somewhat less rampant now than in the recent past, it is nonetheless likely that every advisor will have to grapple with it at some point in his tour.

12. The multiple checks on village fiscal autonomy appear to have developed largely in an effort to prevent corruption. Ironically, their combined effect is to promote if not corruption -- irregularities and inactivity. The activist village or district chief is caught in a squeeze- he can do his job only by bending the regulations on occasion, because the grant of fiscal authority given the village (or district or province) is not appropriate to the degree of responsibility assigned to it.

13. Corruption in rural Viet-Nam is not the black and white situation which Americans tend to make of it. To the Vietnamese, corruption is injustice. Conscious fiscal irregularities, if they contribute to the common good, are not viewed as "corruption." Taking money from the village budget to buy a coffin for a dead PF is an example of this. "Inviting" rich landlords to contribute money to repair a bridge or buy a generator for the elementary school is also thought unobjectionable. An official becomes "corrupt" when he abuses his power by lining his own pockets at the expense of the less fortunate.

14. The law, of course, does not recognize questions of relative morality. Such a situation is made to order for the unscrupulous. Any official who allows an irregularity inevitably becomes a target for those who can audit his books. An official who does not "play along" is subject to reprisals.

15. Solutions are rarely to be found in denunciations and counter-denunciations. Rather, they are to be found in decentralization, simplification and a general matching of
authority and responsibility. In this respect, recent
decrees increasing the formal assets and authority of the
village government are constructive first steps. The local
advisor should not hesitate to bring cases of flagrant cor­
rup tion to the attention of his counterpart and his superiors.
It is equally incumbent on him, however, to attempt to secure
removal of the informal restrictions which, together with
statutory over-control, act to encourage corrupt activity.

D. "STYLE OF WORK".

16. The villager, even the village official, is far
less attuned to alien behaviour than the city dweller, the
district or province official or the ARVN soldier. This
is both an advantage and a pitfall. One hand, village
leaders are rather more ready to accept American good inten­
sions at face value than the city-bred "sophisticate." On
the other hand, village leaders will be more readily con­
fused and, perhaps, irritated by an inappropriate "style
of work" on the part of the advisor.

17. By "style of work" the Vietnamese means the
behavioral patterns and relationships which a person adopts
in order to get a job done efficiently and harmoniously.
In this respect, Americans are most often criticized for
being insensitive, over-direct and over-loud, condescending
and impatient. The back-slapping, jocular form of approach,
which Americans adopt among themselves to establish a friend­
ly, tension-free atmosphere (harmony) is poisonous in deal­
ing with unsophisticated Vietnamese. Unless it is between
very close friends, such behavior is interpreted as extreme
condescension.

18. In light of the above, the cardinal rule in
dealing with village people is to be your well-behaved self.
Remain calm, collected, patient and a little bit formal.
Don't exaggerate gestures and facial expressions; this
inhibits rather than increases understanding. Loud laughter
is a sign of uneasiness, for instance. Smile and speak
slowly in an ordinary tone of voice. Try to develop the
habit of saying something is, for instance, "not very clean,"
rather than "dirty." The ability to speak Vietnamese is an
advantage and a good ice-breaker, but it is not half so
important as being able to adapt behavior to a pattern which
effectively expresses your feelings to the Vietnamese.

19. The advisor should not be inhibited by the cautions
expressed here, but should be guided by them. An effective
style of work can only be learned through practice. Only by
getting out into the villages regularly, and while there

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learning all that he can about a community's background and special characteristics, does an advisor acquire the understanding necessary to deal effectively with village problems.

20. It is desirable to get acquainted with and to show respect for village elders and religious leaders. Solicit their ideas. Work, however, only through the constituted authorities. Do not jump to hasty conclusions about these personnel and do nothing to show disrespect either by word or deed.

21. A project, however attractive, is not worth doing if it is not enthusiastically supported by village leaders. They must be willing to mobilize village resources and make a project a village project. The advisor may be asked to contribute resources; this is an occasion for bargaining. A study of the village budget and development plan will show what resources the village can be expected to contribute.

22. Avoid rash promises. Keep in mind that a conditional promise is often misunderstood as a commitment. When embarking on a major project, be sure to make a written (bi-lingual) agreement.

23. Focus team effort. Select for emphasis areas where the maximum return on invested energy and resources is possible in terms of the overall US/GVN objectives. Bear in mind that while extra effort is usually necessary in the more remote villages, the potential payoff is also greater.

E. VILLAGE FILES - AN INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY FOR ADVISORY TEAMS

24. Adequate information is essential to effective advisory influence in village development. Collection of such information should be a continuing responsibility of every member of a district advisory team, to include MAT advisors.

25. Data collection should be systematic. The objective of a district data collection program should be the creation of a set of village files which may serve as a sort of "institutional memory" for district and MAT advisors. They are invaluable for briefing new arrivals, for handy reference in meeting reporting requirements and, most important, as a tool for planning and for supporting recommendations to counterparts.
26. Following is a suggested procedure for the collection of basic data on village affairs:

a. Objective data is usually available from province and district records and from visits to the villages. The initial collection of this information requires a fair amount of legwork. The job should be divided either geographically or functionally among all capable members of a district team. One team member, such as the deputy district advisor for civil affairs, should be assigned to coordinate the project. He should brief counterpart officials on the project and enlist their assistance if possible.

b. The Village/Hamlet Administrative Status Handbook, which is maintained by the province and district administrative services, is a good point of departure. It contains the names of all village/hamlet officials and other basic information on the administration of each village. If a copy can be obtained, it may be taken along on visits to the villages and its accuracy checked with village officials. It is a convenient springboard for further questioning and discussion.

c. Preferably, information should be collected in the course of a series of visits to each village, rather than all at once. When possible, these visits can be made in the company of a variety of counterparts, such as the district Administrative, Finance and RD Service Chiefs, or the S-1, the S-4 and the S-5 as well as with their superiors. In general, service chiefs and staff officers at district level do not visit the villages often enough - frequently through lack of transportation.

d. Through repeated visits by district advisory team members the initial wariness of village officials concerning requests for detailed information will generally give way to readiness to assist as well as they are able. Overnight visits are excellent for a leisurely review of village history and traditions with village leaders, as well as confidential discussion of their more serious problems.

e. Where possible, copies of current village budgets should be secured. Often district deputies for administration will provide them. These are an invaluable guide to nearly all aspects of village activity.

f. Map-making is an important adjunct of village data collection. Free-hand maps of village areas are usually posted in village offices. These maps go into con-
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Considerable detail—showing village and hamlet boundaries, the locations of houses, public buildings, defensive installations and terrain features. They may be traced or copied on a smaller scale. Advisory teams may wish to consider ditto reproduction of simplified village/hamlet maps as a planning aid for their own use and the use of district and village officials.

**g.** TFES and RFES statistics, of course, should be made part of the village file.

**h.** Once the basic data is on file, periodic updates and editing will be relatively painless. At this point it is desirable to capitalize on advisors' familiarity with the villages by beginning to incorporate subjective evaluations. These may include notes on village problems, on relations between village and district personalities, on the reputation and character of village leaders, on village performance on development projects, on evidence of corruption, and so forth. At a minimum, each departing district or MAT advisor should be required to edit and update the village files and to add his own comments.
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